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THE LSAT: NARRATIVES AND BIAS
LSLIES G. EspINozA*
Fred is tall, dark, and handsome, but not smart.
People who are tall and handsome are popular.
Popular people either have money or are smart.
Joan would like to meet anyone with money.
If the statements above are true, which of the following
statements must also be true?
I. Fred is popular.
II. Fred has money.
III. Fred is someone Joan would like to meet.
(A) I only
(B) II only
(C) Ill only
(D) I and I1 only
E) I, II, and III1
This question is from a recent Law School Admission Test
(LSAT) examination.2 The LSAT is the gatekeeper to the legal pro-
fession. The test is used by law schools in combination with under-
graduate grade point average as the main criteria for admission to
the profession.3 The test can keep you out of law school, it can de-
termine which law school you attend, and it can greatly affect the
way you feel about yourself and your potential for success while in
law school.4
* Professor of Law, University of Arizona College of Law; Assistant Professor of Law,
Boston College Law School, 1992-94.
1. LSAT, Logical Reasoning, Question 14, June 1988 (all LSAT questions on file with
author).
2. The LSAT is an admissions test administered by the Law School Admission Council
(LSAC). The Law School Admission Services (LSAS) administers the LSAC's programs and
provides other services to American and Canadian law schools. LAW SCHOOL ADMISSION
SERvIcEs, LSAT 1992-93 INFOPMArbON Boox (1992) [hereinafter LSAT INFO. Boox 92-93].
3. Id. at 6 ("Almost all ABA-approved law schools require both the LSAT and the Law
School Data Assembly Service (LSDAS), including undergraduate academic record.").
4. Despite the obvious limits of a three or four-hour standardized test, research indi-
cates that test takers' self-image is greatly affected by their scores. Studies analyzing the Scho-
lastic Aptitude Test (SAT) indicate internalization of test measures. See PHYLLs ROSSER,
CENrER FOR WOMEN POLICY STUDIES, THE SAT GENDER GAP: IDENTItYiNO THE CAUSES 22
(1989) ("Unfairly low test scores ... become a self-fulfilling prophecy for many girls and
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Prior to 1979, the LSAT and other standardized tests used for
educational admission purposes were shrouded in secrecy.5 Testing
agencies refused to grant access to the tests to test takers, research-
ers, or state governments. 6 Thus, there was no way to analyze the
appropriateness of questions, the correctness of answers, or even
the accuracy of scoring of individual examinations. 7 What was
known was that women and minorities had substantially lower
scores than white males.8 Additionally, anecdotal tales of biased,
young women; lower scores inspire lower expectations and encourage women to apply to less
competitive colleges and universities than their grades would otherwise warrant."); see also iL
at 41 ("Students' overall perceptions are closer to test feedback than to grade feedback, which
is beneficial for boys' self image but damaging to girls'."). Despite superior academic records,
girls average 19 to 60 points lower on the SAT than boys. Thus, girls judge themselves to be
less able than their grades would indicate, and less able than boys. Id at 41-42, 71. See Sharif
v. New York State Educ. Dep't, 709 F. Supp. 345, 355, 362 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (finding that the
state's sole reliance on SAT scores to award state scholarships is discriminatory because it
disparately impacts young women and concluding that the consistent disparity between males'
and females' scores cannot be explained through "neutral" variables); William Glaberson,
U.S. Court Says Awards Based on SAT's Are Unfair to Girls, N.Y TIMES, Feb. 4, 1989, § 1, at 50(outlining the ruling in Sharif, which was the first in the nation to link standardized tests and
discrimination against a certain group).
5. See Dario F. Robertson, Examining the Examiners: The Trend Toward Truth in Testing, 9
J.L. & EDUC. 167, 170-79 (1980) (examining the legislative response to test secrecy in general
and discussing the impotence of test takers when attempting to address grievances against the
testing services prior to Truth in Testing laws). Robertson claimed that test takers were "de-
fenseless in both the marketplace and the courtroom .. ." because of the secrecy, and that test
subjects "ha[d] no cognizable right to receive more information than the test agencies
deem[ed] appropriate to provide." (citation omitted) Id Although much of the testing mate-
rial was kept secret, researchers were able to examine some test questions and forms in order
to critique them. See David M. White, An Investigation Into the Validity and Cultural Bias of the Law
School Admission Test, in TOWARDS A DrvERsIFuED LEGAL PROFESSION 66, 132-33 (David M.
White ed., 1981) (hereinafter White, Investigation Into Validity and Bias] (using samples from the
LAW SCHOOL ADMISSION BULLTIN and LSAT preparation material to demonstrate existence
of bias in the actual test by inferring that the same biases in the samples will, necessarily, show
up in the actual test).
6. Robertson, supra note 5, at 167, 174-79 (discussing the difficulty third parties had in
obtaining internal studies, financial statements, statistics, or actual questions from the testing
services, and other information which was "vital for public review.. ." of the statistical meth-
ods used to score exams prior to the Truth in Testing laws).
7. See Jocelyn Samuels, Note, Testing Truth-in-Testing Laws: Copyright and Constitutional
Claims, 81 COLuM. L. REV. 179, 190 (1981) (elucidating some of the purposes behind Truth in
Testing laws, which include assuring and encouraging the validity and objectivity of the test,
and the accuracy of the scoring and calculating process); see also Robertson, supra note 5, at167, 178-79 (discussing the test taker's lack of recourse against the testing companies prior to
the Truth in Testing laws when test scores were reported in error, late, or completely lost).
8. See Lloyd Bond, Bias in Mental Tests, in ISSUES IN TESTING: COACHING, DISCLOSURE,
AND ETHNIC BIAs 55, 56 (Bert F. Green ed., 1981) (citing the general fhct that white students,
on average, receive higher scores on standardized tests than non-whites, and that males, as a
group, outperform females); DAviD M. WHITE, NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF BLACK LAWYERS,
THE EFFECTS OF COACHING, DEFECTIVE QUESTIONS, AND CULTURAL BIAs ON THE VALIDI OF
THE LAw SCHOOL ADMISSION TEST 73 (1984) [hereinafter WHITE, EFFECTS OF COACHING,QUESTIONS, AND BIAS] (discussing lower minority scores on the LSAT); Cecil R. Reynolds &Robert T. Brown, Bias in Mental Testing: An Introduction to the Issues, in PERSPECTIVES ON BIAS IN
MENTAL TESTING 4 (Cecil R. Reynolds & Robert T. Brown eds., 1984) (introducing the gen-
eral controversy that surrounds standardized mental tests and the systematic group perform-
ance differences on standardized intelligence and aptitude tests); David M. White, Culturally
Biased Testing and Predictive Invalidity: Putting Them on the Record, 14 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 89,
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disturbing questions and actual evidence of bias in the sample ques-
tions published in the LSAT Information Book began to be
documented. 9
In 1979, New York State passed a "Truth in Testing" law. 10 It
required testing agencies to disclose test questions and answers to
the state."1 The law allowed test takers to request a copy of the test
they had taken, the correct answers, and their own score sheets.12
The law also required test agencies to gather statistical information
on the differential performance of women and minorities.' 3 The
New York law was promptly challenged by the Association of Ameri-
can Medical Colleges (AAMC), the organization which administers
the Medical Colleges Admissions Test (MCAT). 14 In 1980, Federal
District CourtJudge McCum preliminarily enjoined enforcement of
the Truth in Testing law as to the MCAT.15 However, until 1991,
administrators of the other major admissions tests, including the
Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT), the LSAT, and the Graduate Rec-
ord Examination (GRE), complied with the law during the pendency
of the litigation.' 6
114-20 (1979) [hereinafter Culturally Biased Testing] (examining the test score gap between
non-whites as compared to whites and charting the test score gaps on the LSAT as compared
to GPAs of whites and non-whites); David M. White, Pride, Prudice and Prediction: From Brown to
Bakke and Beyond, 22 How. LJ. 375, 377, 391-92 (1979) [hereinafter Pride, Projudice and Predic-
tion] (analyzing the implementation of differential admissions programs, instituted because
minorities, generally, have lower average LSAT scores and lower average GPAs); see also Wade
J. Henderson & Linda Fores, Implications for Affirmative Admissions After Bakke, in TOWARDS A
DIVERSIFIED LEGAL PRoFEssSioN 13, 25-26, 36-41 (David M. White ed., 1981) (discussing the
lower LSAT scores of Council on Legal Education Opportunity fellows, all of whom are edu-
cationally and economically disadvantaged, and most of whom are minorities); Edward Bron-
son, Trial by Numbers: The LSAT and Cultural Bias, 34 GuiLD PRAc. 33 (1977) (charging that
cultural and gender bias in the LSAT generally exists because its form is conducive to bias).
9. See White, Investigation Into Validity and Bias, supra note 5, at 66, 155-56 (discussing
reactions of some individuals when they were read a sample question from the Law School
Admission Bulletin that used a servant as the subject); WnrrE, EFEuors OF COACHING, QUFS-
TIONS, AND BiAs, supra note 8, at 35-43 (discussing the results of a National Conference of
Black Lawyers' study and the responses of people who were shown various LSAT questions
and using anecdotal reactions to questions to explain and reveal forms of bias in testing).
10. New York Standardized Testing Act, N.Y. EDUc. LAw §§ 341-48 (McKinney 1988 &
Supp. 1993).
11. Id. § 342 (McKinney 1988).
12. Id. § 342(2) (McKinney 1988).
13. Id. § 341-a (McKinney 1988).
14. Association of Am. Medical Colleges v. Carey, 482 F. Supp. 1358 (N.D.N.Y. 1980)
[hereinafter AAMC ll,summaryjudgment granted, 728 F. Supp. 873 (N.D.NY. 1990) [hereinafter
AAMC II], rev'd sub nom., vacated, Association of Am. Medical Colleges v. Cuomo, 928 F.2d
519 (2d. Cir. 1991) [hereinafter AAMC III], cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 184 (1991).
15. AAMC I, supra note 14.
16. See infra notes 224-243 and accompanying text (discussing the testing agendes' com-
pliance with Truth in Testing laws and explaining the subsequent stipulation agreements en-
tered into by the agencies regarding test disclosure pending the AAMC litigation); Kevin Sack,
Appellate Panel Grants Reprieve to Law on Tests, N.Y. TIMES, March 14, 1991, at B3 (examining the
Educational Testing Service's national and voluntary policy to disclose test answers).
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Between 1979 and 1991, the content of most standardized admis-
sion tests was disclosed.' 7 Nevertheless, the administrators of the
MCAT continued to refuse to'disclose, and the preliminary injunc-
tion remained in place.' 8 The State of New York continued to try to
negotiate compliance with all other standardized testing organiza-
tions.' 9 In 1988, the AAMC moved for summaryjudgment.20 It al-
leged that the Truth in Testing law violated its copyright interest in
the MCAT.21 The district court granted summary judgment in
1990.22 On appeal, the Second Circuit removed the injunction and
remanded the case for trial on the facts. 3
While the AAMC claimed that disclosure of the MCAT would
harm its copyright interest,24 there is a well established exception to
copyright protection known as the Fair Use Doctrine.2 5 The appli-
cability of the Fair Use Doctrine is determined by balancing the pub-
17. AAMC I, supra note 14, at 874, 878 (mentioning specifically the disclosure of the
SAT and the LSAT in compliance with the New York Truth in Testing law over the previous
ten years).
18. AAMC II, supra note 14, at 874. The temporary restraining order that had been
issued almost a decade earlier was replaced by a permanent injunction by the district court.
AAMC II, supra note 14, at 889.
19. See infra notes 224-243 and accompanying text (explaining the temporary resolution
of the disclosure issue pursuant to stipulation agreements between the agencies and the State
of New York).
20. AAMC III, supra note 14, at 521.
21. AAMC I, supra note 14, at 1361; AAMC II, upra note 14, at 874-75; AAMC III, supra
note 14, at 521-22.
22. AAMC II, supra note 14, at 878-79, 889.
23. AAMC III, supra note 14, at 521.
24. AAMC I, supra note 14, at 1361; AAMC II, supra note 14, at 874-75; AAMC III, supra
note 14, at 521-22.
25. The Fair Use Doctrine establishes that there are certain uses of copyrighted material
that are considered non-infringing, "fair" uses. Although it was originally only recognized at
common law, the Doctrine has been codified in the Copyright Act of 1976. See 17 U.S.C.
§ 107 (1988 & Supp. 111990) (setting forth the four factors to be considered in determining
whether a use of a work will be an acceptable Fair Use). Section 107 lists examples of uses
that might be found fair, including- uses "for purposes such as criticism, comment, news re-
porting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research." Id.
However, this list is not exhaustive. The Fair Use Doctrine and the four factors in the Copy-
right Act, which shape the use of the defense, have been developed and interpreted through
case law. See, eg., Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539 (1985)
(discussing the Fair Use Doctrine and making a distinction between commercial and noncom-
mercial uses of copyrighted works). The Supreme Court has stated:
The factors enumerated in [section 107] are not meant to be exclusive: '[s]ince the
doctrine [of fair use] is an equitable rule of reason, no generally applicable definition
is possible and each case raising the question must be decided on its own facts.'
Id. at 510 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 65, reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5657).
There has been much commentary regarding the history and development of this excep-
tion to copyright protection. See MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON CoPY-
RIGHT § 13.05 (1982) (describing the Fair Use Doctrine and the elements used by courts to
determine whether the use of a work is infringing or fair); Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use
Standard, 103 HARv. L. REV. 110 (1990) (explaining the development of the Fair Use Doctrine
and the general landscape of copyright law in which it is applied); Lloyd L. Weinreb, A Corn-
ment on the Fair Use Doctrine, 103 HARv. L. REV. 1137 (1990) (exploring the analytical confusion
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lic interest in the free flow of information and the private interest of
the copyright holder in controlling and being rewarded for her or
his work.26
The significant public interest in the disclosure of actual test ques-
tions was recognized by both the district court and the Second Cir-
cuit in reviewing the Truth in Testing law. However, the courts
gave significantly more weight to the perceived negative economic
impact that disclosure might have, although the circuit court was
unclear about the harm in requiring a rehearing.27
Despite the concerns raised by the courts, disclosure is the only
effective way to monitor the bias of the testing process.28 It is not
enough for the AAMC and other test agencies, such as the Law
School Admission Council (LSAC), which administers the LSAT, to
disclose statistical and descriptive information about their tests.
There is a narrative content to each test question that-affects the test
taker's ability to analyze that question.2 9 More importantly, the nar-
rative content of individual questions creates a discourse, a thematic
over the application of the Fair Use Doctrine by a number of courts, despite congressional
enactment and interpretation by the Supreme Court).
26. DC Comics Inc. v. Reel Fantasy, Inc., 696 F.2d 24, 27-28 (2d Cir. 1982).
27. The district court recognized and discussed the public interest involved in test dis-
closure. However, the court found that the other factors to be considered under the Fair Use
Doctrine, such as economic injury, strongly supported the plaintiffs (AAMC) in this case.
Thus, the court found in favor of the AAMC. AAMC II, supra note 14, at 885, 887-88. Per-
haps the court did not recognize the full extent of the public interest being served by requir-
ing disclosure of standardized exams and therefore improperly allowed the other factors to
overshadow it.
The circuit court also recognized the public interest that is served by the Truth in Testing
law. However in support of its holding, it cited Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation
Enters., 471 U.S. 539 (1985) which elevated the economic interest of the copyright holder
above all other Fair Use factors and recognized Fair Use as a privilege. The court could not
rule on the issue of injury to the AAMC and therefore could not adequately complete the
balancing test between the public interest and the harm. The 4AMC court stated, "a balance
must be struck between the benefit to the public and personal gain the copyright owner will
receive if the use is denied." AAMC III, supra note 14, at 526 (citing MCA, Inc. v. Wilson, 677
F.2d 180, 183 (2d Cir. 1981)). The case was remanded to the circuit court for further consid-
eration on this issue. AAMC III, supra note 14, at 524-26.
28. The importance of disclosure was recognized by the circuit court at one point: "It is
clear that the goal of the State Act [,Truth in Testing,] is to subject the MCAT to non-com-
mercial comment and criticism." AAMC II, supra note 14, at 884. It could be asserted, how-
ever, that although the court recognized the importance of disclosure, it did not fully
appreciate its importance, especially with regard to the issue of bias.
29. In order to effectively uncover this narrative content it is important for researchers to
have access to various components of standardized tests. See WHrr, EFFECTS OF COACHING,
QUESroNs, AND BIAs, supra note 8, at 73-84 (exploring the importance of using the actual text
in analyzing test bias and score discrepancies among groups and discussing the obstacles that
exist when one is unable to have access to this information); see also Lorrie A. Shepard, Identify-
ing Bias in Test Items, in IssuEs IN TESTING: COACHING, DISCLOSURE, AND ETHNIC BIAs 79, 81
(Bert F. Green ed., 1981) (explaining that focus on the internal properties of a test is impor-
tant when ascertaining bias, because testers' development of guidelines aimed at reducing
bias are done using the full text of the questions, not just statistical evidence of the results).
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content, for the whole test.3 0 That discourse has been one that fa-
vors the dominant social force in our society, white men.3' Only
through disclosure of actual questions can we begin to understand
the relationship between test narratives and bias.
Part one of my article will examine test bias through a narrative
analysis of actual LSAT questions. Part two will describe the legal
action by test agencies to eliminate mandated disclosure and thus
the public's ability to do narrative test analysis. Part three will ana-
lyze the need for continuing narrative analysis. The article con-
cludes that it is only through the exposure and disclosure of
standardized tests that true eradication of bias can occur. Research-
ers must be free to examine questions appearing on actual tests in
order to expose bias. Additionally, test disclosure highlights the
questionable premise of prediction of a student's future academic
performance upon which the use of the LSAT and other standard-
ized tests for admission purposes is based.3 2 The LSAT only
predicts a general correlation between ranges of test scores and
first-year law school grades.33 Should admission decisions be based
30. Discourse is the unspoken, assumed viewpoint of the test. Cf. Martha Minow, The
Supreme Cour, 1986 Term -ForeworjJustice Engendered, 101 HARV. L REv. 10 (1987) (analyzing
the Supreme Court's approach to racial and cultural differences and noting that differences
are created and highlighted through comparisons to what is considered "the norm"; explain-
ing that the Court's attempted use of simple and clear solutions to legal problems exacerbates
differences); Leslie G. Espinoza, Masks and Other Disguises: Exploring Legal Academia, 103 HARV.
L. REV. 1878, 1885 (1990) (exploring the role of Critical Race Theory in identifying and legiti-
mizing the minority experience and explaining that most minorities, especially those in legal
academia, face a common social situation that degrades them); Richard Delgado, Mindet and
Metaphor, 103 HARV. L. REv. 1872, 1874-77 (1990) (discussing the use of metaphors as a stan-
dard by which to analyze and measure the law). Delgado states, "One way in which we make
sense of the world around us is by means of narrative structures, stories, and metaphors." Id.
at 1874.
31. Nancee L. Lyons, FAIR TEST: Nation's Leading Watchdog Over Standardized Tests On a
Mission of Fairness, BLACK IssuEs iN HIGHER EDuc. at 8 (Oct. 12, 1989). Bob Schaeffer,
FairTest's Public Education Director, states that, "ihe very nature of the test itself may be
biased because it is a fast-paced, multiple-choice exam with a premium on guessing and being
superficial ... [i]t is... a brash white boy's game." Id. at 8. Furthermore, FairTest asserts
that an important factor in lowering women's scores is that the "reading comprehension
passages and other questions feature men and male-oriented sports ...." Id
32. See Katherine Conner & Ellen J. Vargyas, The Legal Implication of Gender Bias in Stan-
dardized Testing, 7 BERKELEY WOMEN'S IJ. 13 (1992) (revealing tenuous links between per-
formance on the SAT and actual college performance and stating that the implications and
data from one type of standardized test are instructive with regard to other standardized tests,
such as the LSAT). Additionally, there is little research focusing on the predictive validity of
post-secondary admissions tests for minority females. Conner and Vargyas note, "Differences
in the predictive value of test scores also present serious problems for minority students .. "
Id. at 30-31.
33. LSAT INFO. BooK 92-93, supra note 2, at 125. The information book states:
Correlation is stated as a coefficient for which 1.00 indicates an exact correspon-
dence between candidates' test scores and subsequent law school performance. A
coefficient of zero would indicate nothing more than a coincidental relationship be-
tween test scores and subsequent performance... The correlation between LSAT
scores and first-year law school grades varies from one law school to another...
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on first year performance? Should expected first year performance
be the primary criterion for predicting who is worthy of admission
to the profession, who will be a "good lawyer"?
I. THE NARRATIVE OF LSAT QUESTIONS
The LSAT is promoted as an essentially objective test.3 4 It is
lauded as being able to predict which applicant will be a good law
student.35 Recall the LSAT question about Fred andJoan reprinted
at the beginning of this article. What did it make you think about?
What associations came to mind? The question is from the "Logical
Reasoning" section of the test.3 6 Did the story which comprises the
question have any effect on your ability to discern the objective
steps of logic?
The narrative bias of test questions is the atmospheric, sometimes
subtle, sometimes blatant, often pervasive bias of stories, manners,
sensitivities, and paradigms.3 7 It is the same bias confronted in law
Correlations between LSAT scores and first-year law school grades ranged from .11
to .64 (median is .41).
LSAT INFO. BOOK 92-93, supra note 2, at 125.
34. While the LSAC never actually uses the word "objective," nor claims to be com-
pletely infallible, it portrays the exam as broadly applicable and useful. No specific words of
caution are issued with regard to certain groups, such as women and minorities, who tradi-
tionally score lower on their exams.
When discussing the exam revision process that occurred in the late 1980s, the LSAC
states, "We also examined the performance characteristics of various subgroups of LSAT tak-
ers to determine whether the test optimally met the measurement requirements of the diverse
population of LSAT takers and law school applicants." LAW SCHOOL ADMISSIONS SERVICES,
THE LAW SCHOOL AtrssioNs TEST. SOURCES, CONTENTS, USES 5 (September 1991) [herein-
after LSAT: SouRcEs, CoNENrs, UsEs]. Although it is not stated, the assumption is that they
were able to accomplish this task when incorporating changes into theJune 1991 version of
the ISAT. The LSAC goes on to state that the concern of the Council is that the LSAT be
"fair, valid, [and] reliable . .. " Id, Later the LSAC states that the new version of the LSAT,
instituted injune 1991, functions as well, or better than, the old version in "predicting aca-
demic success in the first year of law school." L
The bulletin further states, in its Cautionary Policies section, that "[b]ecause the LSAT is
administered to all applicants under standard conditions and each test form requires the same
or equivalent tasks of everyone, LSAT scores provide a standard measure of abilities." led at
26. There is no acknowledgement of any limitations or possible bias within the test or the
testing process. The obvious inference is that the LSAT is essentially an objective measure of
an individual's aptitude for law school, regardless of the race or sex of the test taker.
35. Id, at 5 ("[The] LSAT is designed to perform... the task of predicting academic
success in the first year of law school.").
36. See LSAT INFO. BooK 1992-93, supra note 2, at 52 (describing the Logical Reasoning
section and the purpose behind it); see also White, Investigation Into Validity and Bias, supra note
5, at 137-38 (analyzing and discussing the section in the LSAT BuLLErIN 1979-80 that de-
scribes the purpose of the Logical Reasoning section).
37. Narrative analysis is increasingly employed by legal scholars to bring new perspective
to law in order to reveal hidden bias. See Mary I. Coombs, Ousider Scholarship: The Law Review
Stores, 63 CoLo. L. REv. 683, 695-96 (1992) (remarking that outsider scholarship "seeks... to
cross the boundaries that define [the] community by speaking to the dominant community,
but in a different voice.. ." and arguing that the voice often expresses itself through narra-
tives and stories that expose oppression which is overlooked and ignored in mainstream legal
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school examinations,3 8 moot court questions,3 9 casebooks,40 place-
ment interviews, 41 court procedures, judicial language, and eviden-
tiary conventions.4 2
discourse) (citation omitted); Kathryn Abrams, Hearing the Call of Stories, 79 CAL. L. REV. 971
(1991) (analyzing and discussing the use of narrative in feminist legal scholarship); Richard
Delgado, Storytelling for Oppositionists and Others: A Plea for Narrative, 87 MicH. L. REv. 2411
(1989) (examining the use of narratives in legal discourse to challenge the status quo that is
perpetuated and protected by dehumanizing mainstream legal discourse).
38. See PATRICIAJ. WILIAsS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS 80-95 (1991) (discuss-
ing the author's experience with law school faculty and biases after bringing a student com-
plaint of race and gender bias in an exam to their attention).
39. There was a recent controversy at New York University School of Law regarding a
moot court question drafted to require an argument about a fictional mother's custody rights.
The main issue in the problem was the mother's sexual orientation. New York University
School of Law, Moot Court Board, Subjecft Child Custody, Mike Brody v. Carol Brody (case No. 14-
09) in 14 MooT CT. CASEBOOK 381-460 (1990); seeJerry Adler, Taking Offense, NEWS WEE, Dec.
24, 1990, at 48 (mentioning, in a general discussion of "political correctness," the controversy
surrounding New York University Law School's moot court topic based on the custody rights
of a lesbian mother).
40. Traditional law school case books and courses have been criticized as not taking va-
ried perspectives into consideration in their approach to teaching law. See Nancy S. Erickson,
Sex Bias in Law School Courses: Some Common Issues, 38J. LEGAL EDUC. 101, 104-05, 112-16 (1988)
(analyzing the contents of classes, class offerings, and casebooks; finding generally wide-
spread bias in law school classes and materials); Mary 1. Coombs, Crime in the Stacks, ora Tale of
a TexL" A Feminist Response to a Criminal Law Textbook, 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 117 (1988) (condemn-
ing the sexism of a particular criminal law textbook and integrating the use of narrative to
illustrate the analysis and conclusion of the article). However, attempts have been made to
eradicate bias by taking a unique approach to the discussion of traditional legal concepts. See,
,,g., MaryJoe Frug, Re-Reading Contracts: A Feminist Analysis of a Contracts Casebook, 34 Am. U. L.
REv. 1065 (1985) (taking a feminist approach to the analysis of a contracts casebook, finding
that readers' views about gender affect their understanding of a law casebook, the law, and
themselves).
41. See Lisa G. Markoff, Dean Suspends Baker and McKenzie From 1989-'90 Campus Interwiws,
NAT'L LJ. , Feb. 13, 1989, at 4 (relating an incident where a law firm recruiter asked a law
student racist questions and the Dean of the University of Chicago Law School responded by
suspending the firm from interviewing on campus); see also Chris Downey, Firms Try to Heighten
Recruiters' Sensitivity, N.Y.L.J., March 4, 1991, at 1 (reviewing the many steps that are being
taken to help reduce the incidence of discriminatory and improper questions during inter-
views); Jane Cooperman, Law Office Management; Recruitment, NAT'L LJ., July 31, 1989, at 20
(discussing the importance of training law firm recruiters in non-discriminatory interviewing
techniques and listing interview "don'ts" to avoid discriminatory interviews); Paula S. Linden,
Gail G. Peshel &Jamienne S. Studley, Recruitment; TheJobs Graduates Grabbed, NAV'L LJ., March
27, 1989, at 16 (discussing the fact that discrimination against women and minorities in legal
employment still exists and may be evidenced in the form of offensive interview questions).
Discrimination in attorney hiring and promotion is also a continuing problem. A 1988 Na-
tional Law Journal survey found that while 407 of new associates hired were women, only
23% of all lawyers at firms were women and "since 1982, women have increased their share of
partnerships by only one percent per year." Indeed, in 1987, only eight percent of partners
overall were women. The numbers were far worse for minorities. Doreen Weisenhaus, White
Males Dominate Firms: Still a Long Way to Go for Women, Minorities, NAT'L LJ., Feb. 8, 1988, at I.
The National LawJournal's 1990 survey confirms that little has changed in the legal profes-
sion in recent years. See Rita HenleyJensen, Minorities Didn't Share in Finn Growth, NAT'L LJ.,
Feb. 19, 1990, at 1 (listing a breakdown of the number of women and minorities in many of
the nation's largest law firms).
42. See Elizabeth M. Schneider, Task Force Reports on Women in the Courts: The Challenge for
Legal Education, 38J. LEGAL EDUC. 87, 87-88, 92, 95 (1988) (connecting biases in the courts to
law schools and addressing the need for changes in legal education because of its critical role
in affecting and reforming the legal environment); COMMONWEALTH OF MAssAcHusMTrs, RE-
PORT OF THE GENDER BLs STUDY OF THE SUPREMEJUJDICIAL COURT (1989), partially reprinted in
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Bias delegitimizes the whole of the admission test enterprise.
Over the years, I collected LSAT questions that I found to be offen-
sive.43 I have shared these questions with law students for their free
associational responses." Their perspective reveals the relationship
between narrative test bias and disempowerment.
A. LSAT Images of Who You Should Be
Remember Fred: "tall, dark, handsome, but not smart. People
who are tall and handsome are popular. Popular people either have
money or are smart."'45 Next enters the rapacious Joan who would
like to meet anyone with money.46 One student commented, "This
question dearly puts down women, making it seem they pursue men
with money (any man with money). It also puts down men, making
it seem that men who are tall, dark and handsome are not smart." 47
Another student commented that the question reminded her of her
mother's puzzlement that she wanted to go to law school, when she
could just marry a lawyer.48
Test questions are stories. They can also be a form of subtle, un-
conscious psychological warfare.49 This tactic is the way that the
MARYJoE FRuG, WOMEN AND THE LAW 2-16 (1992) (examining gender bias in thejudiciary and
making recommendations regarding reforms to ensure equal treatment of men and women in
the court system); SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, THE VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN ACT OF
1991, S. REP. No. 197, 102D CONG., IST SEss. 43-44 & nn.40, 41 (1991) (stating that women
often face discrimination and gender bias in the court system, and citing many studies that
have been commissioned by the states documenting this pervasive problem).
43. Since 1980, I have collected approximately 100 questions that register from outra-
geously to highly offensive on my personal meter. The question gathering endeavor was both
inspired and assisted by my friend since law school, David White. David White, head of Test-
ing for the Public, is a long-time critic of standardized testing. See generally WHITE, THE EF-
FECTS OF COACHING, QUESTIONS, AND BIAs, .supra note 8, at 27-73 (criticizing the LSAT
generally and specifically addressing bias in testing).
44. Questions were shared with students on an individual basis and in small group set-
tings. Responses to questions have been gathered informally. Students were asked to give
voluntary, anecdotal responses to LSAT questions presented both in and out of the classroom
setting. Many of the students who participated in these discussions were women and minori-
ties. Student reactions were gathered from 1989 to 1992. Law students in Women and the
Law classes, research seminars, and a Law and Literature group from both the University of
Arizona College of Law and from Boston College Law School were included. (Results on file
with the author).
45. See supra note 1.
46. See supra note 1.
47. See supra note 44.
48. See supra note 44.
49. Studies indicate that women do better on test questions that are related to human
relationships and humanities rather than the world of practical affairs, especially regarding
math questions. Connor & Vargyas, supra note 32, at 26 n.67. See ROSSER, supra note 4, at 43
(examining each question on a given SAT exam and comparing its ease or difficulty for the
different sexes; finding that seventeen items were considerably easier for one sex than the
other).
Furthermore, it is often overlooked that a defective or biased question will affect a test
taker's performance on subsequent questions by interrupting his or her concentration. In this
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test reminds "outsiders" 50 that they are indeed outsiders. 5 1 In a sit-
uation of stress and tension,5 2 these questions bring out socialized
self-doubt.53 The outsider candidate is reminded of the formidable
light, a biased question will negatively impact the test taker's score on more than one ques-
tion. See Shepard, supra note 29, at 86 (citation omitted) (discussing the negative "carry-over"
effects of an offensive question item to subsequent questions; explaining that this phenome-
non affects the test takers performance on later questions); WHrE, EFreCtS OF COACHING,
QUESTIONS, AND BIAs, supra note 8, at 75 (supporting the hypothesis that confusion and dis-
traction may result from biased questions and affect the test taker's performance on subse-
quent questions; criticizing the commonly utilized "item-group" analysis that measures a test
taker's reaction only to specific questions).
50. "Outsider" is a term adopted by Professor Mar Matsuda to designate persons of
color, feminists, gays, lesbians, and other oppressed groups. Mar Matsuda, Public Responses to
Racist Speech: Consideringthe l'ictim' Story, 87 MIcH. L REv. 2320, 2323 n.15 (1989). In support
of this alternative terminology, Matsuda explains that the term "minority" is a misnomer be-
cause of the actual large numbers of persons in excluded groups. Id Professor Matsuda also
discusses the importance of recognizing outsider perspectives to various legal issues. See Mar
Matsuda, Affirrative Action and Plowed-Up Ground, 11 HARv. WoMEN's LJ. 1, 2 (1988) (articulat-
ing the need to incorporate outsiders' visions to combat racist preconceptions).
51. -Two additional examples from the LSAT illustrate the disempowered message of
question/stories for women test takers. These passages remind women that examples of their
status as outsiders can easily be seen in everyday life. See LSAT, Logical Reasoning, Question
22, October 1983:
Although there are more women working for wages today than ever before, the aver-
age wage earned by female workers is only about 59 percent of the average earned by
male workers. This is a lower ratio than it was in 1955, when the average income of
female workers was 63.9 percent of that earned by male workers. [Answer choices
excluded];
see also LSAT, Logical Reasoning, Question 6, March 1984:
The principle of equal pay for equal work cannot, by itself, eliminate the discrepancy
between the earnings of men and women. Women and men are not evenly distrib-
uted among ocupations [sic] in our society; men tend to predominate in the higher-
paying occupations. Therefore, even if the principle of equal pay for equal work
were applied, - would result. [Answer choices omitted].
52. See generally Ray Hembree, Correlates, Causes, Effects, and Treatment of Test Anxiety, 58
REv. OF Enuc. REs. 47, 56-58, 60-62, 73 (1988) (compiling results of 562 studies related to
test anxiety and finding that anxiety causes poor performance). Hembree shows that females
have higher anxiety than males at all schooling levels, that African-Americans have higher
anxiety than whites in elementary school, and that Hispanics have higher test anxiety than
whites at all ages. Id. at 60-62. He concludes that self-esteem and test anxiety have a strong
inverse relationship and that low self-esteem causes a high level of test anxiety and thus
poorer performance. Id. at 73.
53. Standardized tests have a strong impact on an individual's self-evaluation of her or
his skills and worth. See Connor & Vargyas, supra note 32, at 20 ("The evidence strongly sug-
gests that students adjust their college expectations based on their SAT or ACT scores;
Lower-scoring females apply to less competitive colleges and universities than their grades
would warrant."); ROSSER, supra note 4, at 22, 41-42 (discussing findings which reveal that
students adjust their expectations of the caliber of school that will accept them based on their
scores on standardized tests, rather than grades or other criteria); cf. Richard Delgado, Words
That Wound- A Tort Action for Racial Insults, Epithets, and Name-Calling, 17 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
Ray. 133, 137 (1982) ("The psychological responses to [racial slurs] consist of feelings of
humiliation, isolation, and self-hatred .... Consequently, it is neither unusual nor abnormal
for stigmatized individuals to feel ambivalent about their self-worth and identity.") (citation
omitted); Charles R. Lawrence 111, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning With Uncon-
scious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 317-18 (1987) (showing that injury from racial inequality
can be painful and severe regardless of the motives behind the action which caused the in-
jury); Espinoza, supra note 30, at 1884 (discussing the self-doubts experienced by legal schol-
ars in various situations).
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barriers to breaking into the professions. 54
Take, for example, the following LSAT question:
The problem with expanding work opportunities for women is
that it results in a dangerous situation for our country; fewer chil-
dren will be born and those children will be less well prepared to
perform well in school and in society.
Which of the following presuppositions is (are) necessary to the
argument above?
I. The more education a woman has, the more likely she is to
choose to work outside her home.
II. Women who choose to work are better mothers than those
who choose to be homemakers.
III. Working women have fewer children than women who do
not join the work force.
54. See, e.g., ISAT, Logical Reasoning, Question 14, October 1988:
In order to get good grades, a college student must either have a high IQor resort to
cheating. Unfortunately, a high IQis something a person is born with; nothing you
do in life can help you get a better one. Therefore, if a student who had a low IQ
upon entering college ends up getting good grades, he ..... (choices omitted).
This question reinforces the bias of a life-time of standardized tests. It is particularly troub-
lesome because of the long-documented bias of the Stanford-Binet IQ exam and other intelli-
gence tests. See STvEN J. GouLD, Tan MisMnA.sua oF MAN 146-234 (1981) (tracing the
development of the popular Stanford-Binet IQ test, and the uses and misuses of the test
throughout the years). Although the Binet test was initially developed to identify children
with learning disabilities, and not to rate the intelligence of all children, it was eventually
developed into a mass-marketed exam by Dr. Lewis M. Terman, a professor at Stanford Uni-
versity (thus the name Stanford-Binet). Dr. Terman was the "primary architect of its
[Stanford-Binet's] popularity." Id at 174-75. The guidelines for narrow and controlled use
of the Binet test were disregarded in the United States. Id Furthermore, the widespread use
of the Stanford-Binet IQtests and those modeled after it, often developed out of racist theo-
ries of hereditary intelligence, as in the case of Terman. Id. at 175. Despite the broad use of
IQ exams during the last fifty years, and the reliance upon them, there is no independent
confirmation for the proposition that tests accurately measure intelligence. Id at 177.
Researchers have questioned the legitimacy of intelligence tests. See Bond, supra note 8, at
63 (breaking down the issues of testing bias, analyzing tests and questioning whether bias
exists in the internal structure and criteria of tests, in situational factors, and in the employ-
ment and use of tests). Bond discusses a study comparing the results of intelligence tests
given to a group of African-American children who had been adopted by white parents to the
results of tests given to white adoptee children in the same geographical area. Bond, supra
note 8, at 64. This study was done to question the theory that intelligence is genetic and to
challenge findings which attributed minorities' lower scores on tests to their genetic makeup.
The study concluded that the African-American children tested had scores higher than the
national white average, above the African-American average, and above other African-Ameri-
cans reared in the same area. Thus, the results are inconsistent with genetic explanations for
difering Iqperformance between whites and African-Americans. Bond, supra note 8, at 65-
66.
The issue of test bias is a complicated and controversial one. Most academics who have
studied the issue have been unable to fully explain the reason for differing outcomes among
groups. Bond, supra note 8, at 61-62. While many testing agencies have developed formal
guidelines and review procedures for spotting and removing biased questions, the most diffi-
cult problem is that beyond blatantly biased questions, it is hard to predict ahead of time
which questions will be the most difficultfor which groups. See Shepard, supra note 29, at 79,
85-87, 99 (discussing the prediction and analysis of both subtle and statistical bias in test
questions and recognizing the difficulty in attributing different meanings in test questions to
bias or other "legitimate" reasons).
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(A) II only
(B) III only
(C) I and II only
(D) II and III only
(E) I, II and III-
Now imagine yourself a woman taking the LSAT. If you do not have
children, but at least want to leave open the possibility of having
children, the question forces you to think of this very difficult and
personal choice. If you have children, and are now taking the big
step of disrupting your whole life to go to law school, what is this
question explicitly telling you? Your children will suffer because
you insist on pursuing your own selfish dream of success.55 In any
event, the question makes the test taking personal. It takes the wo-
man reader off-track.57 The question is gender-related on its face.
It is gender-biased in the devious way that it appears to be a neutral
question about "logic." However, the question is instead a re-
minder that for women, the demands that go hand-in-hand with ex-
panded opportunities can leave us with the choice that is no choice
at all.58
55. LSAT, Logical Reasoning, Question 4, October 1982.
56. Women are also reminded that their education will probably be wasted in society'sjudgment. See LSAT, Logical Reasoning, Question 5, October 1980:
Mr.Jones argued that money spent on higher education is wasted. He supported his
argument by referring to the case of a woman who, at great expense, completed a
Ph.D. in English literature only to decide later to move to a remote area and devote
her life to meditation, reading no books of any kind. [answer choices omitted]
Many of my women students strongly responded to this question. In their minds, meditation
was a metaphor for having and raising children. See supra note 44; see also Leslie G. Espinoza,
Constrceing a Professional Ethic, 4 BERIELEY WotsEN's LJ. 215, 226 (1989-90) ("Women stu-
dents who choose to make quite reasonable compromises internalized their failure to emulate
the model of lawyering constructed through the mythology of the institution. Indeed, much
of the exclusion of women from the power centers of the law is based far more on their
inability 'to maintain the appearance of total dedication to their careers.' ") (citation omitted).
57. See Cathy L. W. Wendler & Sydell T. Carlton, An Examination of SAT Verbal Items
for Differential Performance by Women and Men: An Exploratory Study, Paper for the Amer-
ican Educational Research Association Annual Meeting (April 1987) (on file with FairTest,
National Center for Fair & Open Testing, Cambridge, Mass.) (discussing the possible reasons
for women's lower SAT scores and explaining that one possible factor might be that women
are more adversely affected than men "by negative, possibly upsetting, questions."); see also
Shepard, supra note 29, at 79, 86 (referring to the negative "carry-over" effects of offensive
questions to subsequent questions, implying that test takers are distracted from the intended
purpose of the question by questions biased against them); WHrrE, EFFECTS OF COACHING,QUESTIONS, AND BIAs, supra note 8, at 75 (supporting the hypothesis that confusion and dis-
traction may result from biased questions, thus taking the test takers off-track and affecting
their performance on subsequent questions as well).
58. See Espinoza, supra note 56, at 226 (discussing a woman's difficulty when she must
choose between a career and a family or do both with heightened stress and guilt). See gener-
ally Susan Gore & Thomas W. Mangione, Social Roles, Sex Roles and Pychological Distress: Additive
and Interactive Models of Sex Differences, 24J. HEALTH & Soc. BEHAV. 300, 301 (Dec. 1983):
mhe mental health of employed married women is still poorer than that of em-ployed married men - and not markedly better than that of married homemakers
.... From a sex-role perspective, these findings are not surprising. Whereas work is
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Women test takers are not being hypersensitive. Nor are they
grappling with imaginary hobgoblins. The conflict between career
and family is a real one for women.59 In her controversial "Mommy-
track" article in the Harvard Business Review, Felice Schwartz sets
forth the common wisdom and the actual facts regarding the work/
family conflict:
Like many men, some women put their careers first. They are
ready to make the same trade-offs traditionally made by the men
who seek leadership positions. They make a career decision to
put in extra hours, to make sacrifices in their personal lives, to
make the most of every opportunity for professional develop-
ment. For women, of course, this decision also requires that they
remain single or at least childless or, if they do have children, that
they be satisfied to have others raise them. Some 90 percent of
executive men but only 35 percent of executive women have chil-
dren by the age of 40.60
The social reality is that for women who are now forty, the decision
to become professionals has different consequences and costs than
it has for men. Efforts to equalize women's opportunities for career
and family continue. 6' These efforts, however, are undermined by
the LSAT's reiteration of the discriminatory stereotypes of the past,
however much they are couched in the neutral language of Logical
Reasoning.62
compatible with the family-role expectations of men, it is less compatible with the
family roles of most wbmen, thus resulting in role stress and the poorer mental
health of women (citations omitted).
59. See FRuG, supra note 42, at 81-133 (devoting an entire chapter of her casebook to the
work/family conflict). Frugwrites:
Workplace responsibilities often conflict with family duties in ways that produce sig-
nificant stress and substantial barriers to women as they seek to assimilate and to
advance in their labor force jobs.
Id at 2;Joan C. Williams, Gender Wars: Selfless Women in thb Republic of Choice, 66 N.Y.U. L. REv.
1559 (1992) (analyzing the pressure on women to take care of their children and parents at
the expense of their careers); Deborah L. Rhode, Perspectives on Professional Women, 40 STAN. L.
Rnv. 1163 (1988) (examining the barriers to women's career advancement that continue to
exist because of the dual burdens women face with work and family responsibilities); Karen
Czapanskiy, Volunteers and Draftees: The Struggle for Parental Equality, 38 UCLA L. REv. 1415
(1991) (exploring the volunteer father/draftee mother conceptualization in family law and
how a reallocation of childcare duties between parents would alleviate part of the conflict
women feel in the workplace).
60. Felice N. Schwartz, Management Women and the New Faces ofLife, HAv. Bus. Rnv.,Jan.-
Feb. 1989, at 65, 69.
61. See Faye Fiore, Women's Career - Family Juggling Act, L.A. TiEs, Dec. 13, 1992, at D3
(discussing the approach taken by some employers to reduce the pressures of the work/family
conflict on their female employees); Mork and Women, BOSTON GLOBE, June 14, 1992, at 86
(reporting the results of a survey which found that women are still suffering from the pres-
sures of the work/family conflict and concluding that more flexible hours are necessary to
alleviate pressures).
62. This stereotyping that highlights historical discrimination is evident in one of the few
LSAT questions addressing people with disabilities. See LSAT Logical Reasoning, Question
14, June 1982:
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Lawyers are supposed to rise above the emotions of the problem.
Perhaps it is logical that the LSAT should construct an emotional
obstacle course. Maybe it should screen out all applicants who can-
not objectively apply the rules of logic. However, this is not the
intent of the law schools that use the test to make admission deci-
sions. More importantly, the discourse of the test does not chal-
lenge the emotional steadiness of white males. The "distractor
questions" are discriminatory because they effect only the outsider
test taker.63
B. The LSAT Vision of What the Law Should Be
For many students, the LSAT is their first official contact with the
study of law and the construction of legal professionalism. The
questions within the test often present a social world view that ex-
cludes outsider test takers. Frequently the context of the question
distorts the content or the meaning of the question for the test
taker. For example, one question places us at a dinner party in a
mythical land:
In Evalsland, where it is legal to hold slaves, the guests at a dinner
party get into a debate.
One of the guests contends that slavery is a cruel institution. But
the host contends that the slaves themselves like it. To prove his
point, the host called in the household slaves, all of whom affirm
that they do indeed find their condition not simply tolerable but
extremely pleasant.
Which of the following would seriously weaken the host's argu-
ment in the passage above?
I. Whenever slaves are offered their freedom they usually take
it.
II. There have been numerous slave revolts in recent years.
III. All religions have forbidden one man to be a master over
another.
IV. Slavery is an extremely inefficient institution because free la-
bor is much more productive.
(A) I and II only
(B) I and IV only
The demand for bus and subway systems accessible (sic) to and useable by handi-
capped people in wheelchairs actually discriminates against all but the most athletic
of the handicapped, because most people in wheelchairs do not have the physical
strength to wheel their chairs from their homes or offices to subway or bus platforms.
[question and answer choices omitted].
63. Distractor questions are those questions that cause the reader to become distracted
from the application of logic to find an answer. See supra note 50 (defining "outsider" as a
term of art); see also WHrrE, EFFECrs OF COACHING, QUESTIONS, AND BIAS, Supra note 8, at 88-
91 (showing how word choices in LSAT questions have different associations for minority test
takers).
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(C) II and III only
(D) III and IV only
(E) I, II, Ill and IV64
As one African-American student expressed, first the question re-
minds you that you are Black, then it forces you to try to divorce
yourself from yourself, to pretend that you can look at the question
without you looking at the question.65 Furthermore, how can this be
called Logical Reasoning when it would be useless to make any logi-
cal arguments to the host, who is obviously so blind that he will
never see. Logic has no place in this situation at all.66
The question begins with the premise that it is legal to hold
64. LSAT, Logical Reasoning, Question 4, February 1986.
65. See supra note 44. The LSAC administers the LSAT and has chosen to allow this type
of material to appear on tests without regard to its effect on the test taker. Indeed, the follow-
ing sample LSAT question was highly criticized in the early 1980's:
A servant who was roasting a stork for his master was prevailed upon by his sweet-
heart to cut off one of its legs for her to eat. When the bird was brought to the table,
the master asked what had become of the other leg. The man answered that storks
never had more than one leg. The master, very angry but determined to render his
servant speechless before he punished him, took the servant the next day to the fields
where they saw storks each standing on one leg. The servant turned triumphantly to
the master, but the master shouted and the birds put down their other legs and flew
away. "Ah sir," said the servant, "you did not shout to the stork at dinner yesterday;
if you had he too would have shown his other leg."
LAw SCHOOL AnMIssioN SERVIcEs, LAW SCHOOL ADMISSION BULxrN AND LSAT PREPARATION
MATERIAL, Logical Reasoning, Questions 3-4 (1979-80); see White, Investigation into Validity and
Bias, supra note 5 at, 154-55 (commenting that this LSAT question presented is "[plerhaps the
most startling and revealing passage encountered."). The question presents an offensive
story which can be critiqued in different ways and can affect readers in varied ways. Cf. Robert
Williams Jr., Taking Rights Aggressively: The Perils and Promises of Critical Legal Theory for Peoples of
Color, 5 LAW & INE.J. 103, 104-08 (1987) (using a parable about a Native-American "Grand-
father" and an elevator to discuss the different positive and negative aspects of Critical Legal
Theory for peoples of color).
66. Logic divorced from content is also evident in the following two LSAT passages:
By 1670, African slaves took the place of the vanished Native Americans brought to
the Caribbean a century earlier from areas farther north. Since many of the Africans
were already immune to malaria and yellow fever, relatively few of them died on the
island plantations as a result of these diseases. But ultimately the differing immuni-
ties of the two slave groups did not matter, for the Africans succumbed to other
gastrointestinal and infectious diseases. [answer section omitted].
LSAT, Logical Reasoning, Question 14, December 1984.
The question asks the reader to do a logical comparison of death and disease of oppressed
people. It is an example of the same kind of mentality that viewed slavery as an economic
calculus rather than a human tragedy. Expression of this viewpoint serves to further alienate
outsider test takers. The second passage presents another comparison:
John Stuart Mill compared the position of married Englishwomen in the nineteenth
century to that of slaves. Marital slavery was even worse, he said, because married
women had fewer rights than slaves and more onerous duties and were expected to
love their masters and their situation. How silly Mill's comparison is can be seen by
turning the tables and thinking of husbands as slaves and wives as slaveholders. That
makes equal sense, and the analogy collapses. [answer choices omitted].
LSAT, Logical Reasoning, Question 7, February 1989.
These two questions offer a new kind of competition between oppressed groups looking up
from the bottom. It forces the test taker to separate logic from the actual content of the
question.
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slaves. 67 A vision of law is presented that directly contradicts cur-
rently held ideals. The law presented in the question validates the
institution of slavery. Assessment of slavery now becomes a game of
rationality and logic, not a recognition of oppression. This excising
of value from the analysis of slavery, as required by the question,
obscures the real content and legacy of slavery. The pretense of the
question, the way the question pretends that normative judgment is
not relevant, is the most relevant and biased aspect of the question.
The outsider test takers are reminded that they are clearly
outside, excluded.68 Not only are they outside, they are subjugated
just like the slaves in the question. They have to pretend that the
question and the whole test process is not only tolerable, but just
and "logical."
In a quest for diversity within test questions, the LSAT only suc-
ceeds in objectifying outsiders, not including them. What the white
people say is what is important. The outsider remains the object,
the subject is the dominant society. This is exemplified in an LSAT
question discussing diversity in the academy:
The universities should not yield to the illiberal directives of the
Office of Civil Rights that mandate affirmative action in hiring fac-
ulties. The effect of the directives to hire minorities and women
under threat of losing crucial financial support is to compel uni-
versities to hire unqualified minorities and women and to discrim-
inate against qualified nonminorities and men. This is just as
much a manifestation of racism, even if originally unintended, as
the racism the original presidential directive was designed to cor-
rect. The consequences of imposing any criterion other than that
of qualified talent on our educational establishments are sure to
67. See supra note 64.
68. Examples of LSAT questions excluding outsider test takers also include questions
regarding nationality, ethnicity, and stereotyping based on race. See, e.g., LSAT, Logical Rea-
soning, Question 7, October 1987:
Few United States high school students achieve fluency in languages other than their
native English. Which of the following, if true, would best explain the causes of the
situation described above? [answer choices omitted].
Of course, far from all high school students in the United States call English their "native"
language. This assumption alienates those test takers who do not agree with the question's
premise. See LSAT, Logical Reasoning, Question 12, February 1988:
In a certain mythical community where there are only two social classes, people from
the upper class are all highly educated, and people from the lower class are all hon-
est. Maria is poor. If one infers that Maria is honest and uneducated, one presup-
poses that class status in the mythical society depends upon ... [answer choices
omitted].
Why "Maria"? Is Maria by any chance Hispanic? This is one of a handrul of questions using
non-Anglo names. The question creates a vision of insiders and outsiders based on ethnicity
and class.
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be disastrous in the quest for new knowledge and truth, as well as
subversive of our democratic values.
Which of the folowing (sic), if true, would considerably weaken
the argument above?
I. The directive requires universities to hire minorities and wo-
men when no other applicant is better qualified.
II. The directive requires universities to hire minorities and wo-
men only up to the point that these groups are represented
on faculties in proportion to their representation in the pop-
ulation at large.
III. Most university employees are strongly in favor of the
directive.
(A) I only
(B) i only
(C) III only
(D) I and II only
(E) II and III only69
As one student commented, "Why base a question on such contro-
versial racial issues. It is really disturbing."70 Most of the outsider
students who read the question were so upset by the imposing na-
ture of the text that they were unable to focus on arguments that
would weaken the statement.71
This is diversity askew. Many students commented that they find
themselves constantly in the position of justifying affirmative ac-
tion.?2 There is always the implicit, raised eyebrow, that no matter
what they say, they cannot really be logical about the issue, because
after all they are certainly the beneficiaries of the policy.73
The distracting nature of the question is certainly of concern.
The question takes affirmative action and discusses it only from the
perspective of white males.7 4 Additionally, even the answer
69. LSAT, Logical Reasoning, Question 22, October 1988.
70. See supra note 44.
71. See supra note 44.
72. See supra note 44.
73. For a discussion of the stigma associated with affirmative action see Leslie G. Espi-
noza, Empowerment and Achievement in Minority Law Students' Support Programs: Constructing Affirma-
tive Action, 22 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 281, 286-90 (1989) (discussing the stigmas involved as a
result of using academic support programs for minority law students) and STEPHEN L.
CARTER, RErrLfaoNs OF AN AFRFIrsrrwn AcrboN B ,v (1991) (suggesting that affirmative
action creates more stigma than help for African-Americans and other racial minorities).
74. ISAT questions continually force outsiders to place themselves in the perspective of
white males. See e.g. LSAT, Reading Comprehension, Question -, December 1991, reproduced
in THz OFmcrAL L.SAT PRPa TEsT III, Dec. 1991, form 2LSS13 (discussing Native American
diversity and analyzing Navajo weaving from the perspective of Anglo influence).
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choices75 focus on qualifications rather than past discrimination. 76
Rather than being inclusive, it is a diversity that increases exclusion.
It requires test takers to justify their inclusion, regardless of qualifi-
cations. It increases the sense of "otherness."
II. CHALLENGE TO TRUTH IN TESTING LAWS
Standardized tests now play an accepted and significant role in
admissions for almost all educational levels in the United States.77
In order to be considered for admission to college, most undergrad-
uate schools require the SAT 78 or its companion test, the ACT.
These tests are also required for admission to professional schools.
Most medical schools require the MCAT, most business schools re-
quire the GMAT, and most law schools require the LSAT.
75. An analysis of questions from the LAw SERVICES INFORMATION Boox, published after
implementation of the LSAC's newest sensitivity review, reveals continued bias. Often this
form of bias is more subtle and occurs in answer choices. Certain answer choices are dispro-
portionately attractive to outsiders. For example, one reading comprehension passage ana-
lyzes the life and work of Phillis Wheatley, a former slave and early American poet. The first
question following the passage asks for the best expression of the main idea in the passage.
LSAT INFO. Boox 92-93, supra note 2, at 58-59. Answer choices include: "(B) Although Phil-
lis Wheadey had to overcome significant barriers in learning English, she mastered the liter-
ary conventions of eighteenth-century English as well as African aesthetic cannons." and "(C)
Phillis Wheatley's poetry did not fulfill the potential inherent in her experience but did repre-
sent a significant accomplishment." Answer (C) is the correct answer. LSAT INFO. BOOK 92-
93, supra note 2, at 58-59. When I first read the question, I chose answer (B)-to me it was the
main theme and story of the passage. Similarly, the first question following a reading passage
on sex-related wage differentials in the 1991-92 Law Services Admission Book, asks for the
best title to the passage. LAw SCHOOL ADMISSION SERVICES, LSAT 1991-92 INFORMATION
BooK 74-75 (1991)[hereinafter LSAT INFO. Boox 91-92]. Choices include: "(B) Women in
Low-Paying Occupations: Do They Have a Choice?; (C) Sex Discrimination in the Workplace;
(D) The Roll of Social Prejudice in Women's Careers." Ia On my first read, I was certain that
(C) or (D) were the correct answers. Wrong again. The correct choice impliedly places the
subordinate economic status of women in their own hands.
76. See Richard Delgado, The Imperial Scholar Reflections on a Review of Civil Rights Litera-
ture, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 561-63 (1984) (commenting on the lack of minority scholarship on
civil rights issues and explaining that this authorship by primarily white males ignores the past
history of discrimination by creating a one-sided view of civil rights legal literature).
77. In 1926, the College Board, a nonprofit organization, introduced the Scholastic Apti-
tude Test (SAT). The SAT is now administered through the Educational Testing Service
(ETS). ETS is the largest test maker in the country. It is a non-profit company which designs
standardized tests for over 375 clients. Gil Sewall, Tests: How Good? How Fair?, NE wswzEx,
Feb. 18, 1980, at 99-100 (examining different types of standardized testing and criticism
about them). ETS currently designs the LSAT. However, during the 1980's the LSAT was at
times designed in-house by LSAC and at times by the test designer ACT. See LSAT: SouncEs,
CONTENTS, USES, supra note 34, at 1-4 (giving the history and evolution of the LSAT).
78. Since its introduction in 1926, the College Board has always described the SAT as a
supplementary measure to other admissions criteria. From its inception, the Board warned of
a danger in placing too great an emphasis on the test scores. John Elson, The Test That Eveiy.
one Fears, TME, Nov. 12, 1990, at 93 (discussing the problems that have arisen with the SAT
and the resulting revisions of the test by the trustees of the College Board).
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A. Description of Truth in Testing Laws
1. Political Backdrop to Regulation
By 1979, standardized tests, which had been used for decades as
admission criteria, were severely criticized2 9 The criticism focused
on the secrecy surrounding administration and evaluation of the
tests.80 Secrecy compounded the prevelance of race and gender
bias.81 During this time, Ralph Nader's consumer organization,
Congress Watch Public Citizen, issued a study which condemned
the Educational Testing Service (ETS), the creator and administra-
tor of the SAT.8 2 The six-year Nader study concluded that the SAT
successfully predicted college performance in only one out of ten
cases.8 3 The study found that SAT score correlation to family in-
come was much stronger than the correlation to college perform-
ance.8 4 Based on new evidence of bias, the 1.8 million member
National Education Association campaigned to abolish standardized
testing in the public schools.8 5 Additionally, studies indicated that
the tests were "coachable," and that the results of the tests were not
79. Recent commentary has documented over a decade of criticism of standardized test-
ing. See, e.g., Susan Campbell, Opinions Differ on Suitability, Fairness of Standardized Tests: Stan-
dardized Tests Are: A. Needed B. Unfair C. Disputed, HARTFORD CouRTr, October 2, 1992, at BI
(finding, through interviews with high school teachers, that standardized test results do not
reflect a logical pattern consistent with a student's achievement); Sean Piccoli, Charges Persist
SiTs Biased Against Women and Minorities, WASHINGTON Timms, August 5, 1991, at G6 (discuss-
ing allegations that the SAT promotes cultural, racial, and gender bias).
80. See Minutes of Proceedings, New York Joint Public Hearing of the Senate and Assembly Standing
Committees on Higher Education 2-4 (May 9, 1979) [hereinafter NYJoint Hearing] (remarks of Sen.
Kenneth P. Lavalle, Chairman, Senate Committee on Higher Education) (arguing against the
secretive nature of standardized testing); see also Robertson, supra note 5, at 180-93 (1980)
(discussing the legislative response to secrecy in standardized testing and Truth in Testing
laws).
81. Because test makers were able to keep test questions secret, the biases in the ques-
tions went unchecked by third parties. Nevertheless, some researchers were able to gain ac-
cess to test forms and sample questions and discovered the presence of bias. See Bronson,
supra note 8, at 33 (1977) (charging that the form of standardized tests is the basis for produc-
ing racial bias in testing); White, Culturally Biased Testing, supra note 8, at 107 (1979) (showing
cultural biases through statistics in LSAT testing); cf David A. Weber, Racial Bias and the
LSAT. A New Approach To the Defense of Preferential Admissions, 29 BUFF. L. REv. 439 (1975) (dis-
cussing the need to reexamine the LSAT to determine if it is unconstitutional based on its
inherent racial bias); White, Pride, Prudice and Prediction, supra note 8, at 375 (1979) (exploring
the need to continue the legacy of Brown v. Board of Education with the integration of profes-
sional schools by eliminating the racial bias in LSAT testing).
82. Nader's organization published the results of its six-year study in The Reign of ETS
(1979). This study was used by the media to expand on the criticism of ETS and standardized
testing. See, eg., Sewall, supra note 77, at 99, 100 (using quotes from Nader's ETS study to
question the fairness of standardized testing).
83. See Sewall, supra note 77, at 101 (highlighting the results of the Nader study).
84. See Sewall, supra note 77, at 101 (discussing the Nader study's commentary on the
weaknesses of the SAT).
85. See Sewall, supra note 77, at 101 (discussing the reaction of the National Education
Association to the Nader study). ETS commented that the study was "deliberately fraudu-
lent" in its finding that there was little or no correlation between scores in standardized test-
ing and a student's subsequent grades in college. Sewall, supra note 77, at 101.
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always an apt indicator of students' later performance. 86
Legislative efforts to control admissions tests centered on "Truth
in Testing," which would, at minimum, require test makers to re-
lease their examinations for inspection.8 7 California passed a Truth
in Testing law in 1979.8 It was soon followed by a similar law in
New York.8 9 New York's law, passed after extensive legislative hear-
ings, was a more comprehensive law, requiring disclosure of actual
test questions.9 0 It became the model for Truth in Testing pro-
posed legislation.91 In 1979, five other states had legislation pend-
ing.92 By early 1980, fourteen states and the federal government
were considering similar laws.93 Indeed, such politically formidable
organizations as the Parent Teacher Association (PTA) and the Na-
tional Association for the Advancement of Colored People
(NAACP) banded together to support the national legislation."
2. New York's Truth in Testing Law
The New York Truth in Testing law, officially entitled the Stan-
dardized Testing Act, applies to "any test that is given ... at the
expense of the test subject and designed for use and used in the
process of selection for post-secondary or professional school ad-
missions." 95 Rather than taking on the whole world of standardized
tests, the law only regulates tests used for college and professional
school admissions. 96 The two main provisions of the New York law
address the specific concerns enunciated in the Act's legislative
86. See White, Pride, Preudice and Prediction, supra note 8, at 392-96 (noting that studies on
LSAT results show that ISAT scores are better at distinguishing between the races of the test
takers than they are at predicting a student's performance in law school).
87. See Sewall, supra note 77, at 104 (explaining the New York state legislature's support
of test disclosure).
88. CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 99150-99164 (Deering 1993).
89. N.Y. EDUC. Lov § 340-348 (McKinney 1988 & Supp. 1993).
90. Id § 341(1) (McKinney 1988); see Samuels, supra note 7, at 179-81 (discussing New
York's Truth in Testing law and the controversy surrounding its requirements of disclosure of
test contents, test scores, and evaluative studies).
91. See Sewall, supra note 77, at 99 (discussing the reaction of other states to the passage
of New York's Truth in Testing law).
92. SeeJoanne Omang, Making the Grade: Standardized Tests Are Under Attack; Critics Drivefor
'Truth in Testing, WAsH. PosT, Dec. 26, 1979 atA0 (noting that in 1979, California, Colorado,
Florida, Maryland, Ohio, and Pennsylvania all had legislation pending to regulate standard-
ized testing).
93. See Sewall, supra note 77, at 99 (noting that New York's Truth in Testing law inspired
fourteen other states and the federal government to consider bills requiring test makers to
disclose the content of their exams to the public).
94. See Sewall, supra note 77, at 104 (showing that the supporters of a national Truth in
Testing law included influential groups).
95. N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 340 (1) (McKinney 1988).
96. N.Y. EDUC. LIAw § 340(1) (McKinney 1988). Butsee Connor & Vargyas, supra note 32,
at 13 (describing other uses of standardized tests such as employment and elementary school
tracking, and detailing the gender bias inherent in this type of testing).
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hearings.97
The first provision of the Act requires test agencies to file and
make public their research information, studies, and evaluations of
the tests.98 This provision allows New York state officials, through
the Commissioner of Education, to have a better basis to evaluate
the tests.99 Study disclosure provides more information upon which
to examine the evaluations of the tests and claims made about them
by the test agencies. 100 The provision also allows outside research-
ers, like the author of this article, to have access to basic, fundamen-
tal information regarding the test and its outcome correlations. It
makes available to researchers the LSAC's and ETS's internal stud-
ies. In drafting this provision, legislators took into account the testi-
mony, at the New York hearings, of a number of researchers
regarding repeated requests to get even simple data from the test
agencies which went unanswered or were refused.101 Prior to the
passage of the law, ETS had the ability to suppress internal studies
that were critical of the tests, for example those which found bias,
97. See generally NYJoint Hearing, supra note 80 (discussing the foundations ofthe Truth in
Testing law in a state public hearing).
98. N.Y. EDuc. LAw § 341(l)-(2) (McKinney 1988) provides that:
Whenever any test agency prepares or causes to have prepared research which is
used in any study, evaluation or statistical report pertaining to a test operational after
January first, nineteen hundred eighty, such study, evaluation or report shall be filed
with the commissioner [of Education].
99. Id. § 341(1) (McKinney 1988).
100. See ANDREW J. S=TRNIO, THE TESTNG TRAP 274 (1981) (commenting on the pre-
Truth in Testing world and the extreme importance placed upon the role of standardized
testing results in achieving success). Strenio states:
The information available to permit an adequate assessment to be made of these
secure tests is quite unsatisfactory .... I would like to repeat a statement which I
made forty-two years ago; today it is practically impossible for a competent test tech-
ncian or test consumer to make a thorough appraisal of the construction, validation,
and use of most standardized tests being published because of the limited amount of
trustworthy information supplied by test publishers and authors .... Unfortunately,
although some progress has been made, my 1935 complaint is equally applicable
today to the majority of existing tests, and especially so for secure tests.
Id.
101. See NYjoini Hearings, supra note 80, at 121-23 (testimony of Allan Nairn, speaker for
Congress Watch Public Citizen on ETS study) (providing a factual basis to show the merits of
the proposed Truth in Testing law). The testimony provides in relevant part: "[E]ntire cate-
gories of statistical information and numerous internal reports and critiques of great impor-
tance to scholars and the consuming public are now routinely withheld by the testing
industry." NY joint Hearing, supra note 80, at 121. In his testimony, Allan Nairn gave three
examples of test agencies withholding important data and studies. One example was the re-
fusal by ETS to release a study prepared by Dr. David Loye of the ETS staff. The report was
prepared at the request of the president of ETS. The report, entitled "Cultural Bias in Test-
ing: Challenge and Response," discussed the strengths and weaknesses of ETS tests in as-
sessing the performance of minorities and poor people. NYJoint Hearing, supra note 80, at
123; see also NI'Joint Hearing, supra note 80, at 35-36 (testimony of Steven Solomon, New York
Public Interest Research Group) (recounting various personal experiences involving repeated
requests made to testing agencies for information and reports which were subsequently
ignored).
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and to release only the studies that were favorable. 0 2
The second provision of the law requires test agencies to file with
the state a copy of the actual examination administered.10 3 This
type of test disclosure allows the state and outside watchdog groups
to monitor the tests for accuracy and fairness. The law also requires
test agencies to release, to test takers who so request, a copy of the
test questions, the correct answers and the scoring rules for the
tests.' 0 4 In support of this provision, Senator Lavalle explained on
the floor of the New York State legislature that disclosure legislation
provides fundamental fairness to test takers.' 0 5 He stated that prior
to passage of the law, the test agencies refused to return answer
sheets, reveal tests, provide raw scores, or tell students how they
performed compared to other students.' 0 The test agencies pro-
vided no method for a test taker to determine if her or his particular
test was properly graded.' 0 7 Additionally, there was substantial evi-
dence of mistakes in administration of the tests.108
The New York law now also requires test agencies to prepare a
statistical report for tests administered between July 1, 1988 and
July 1, 1989.109 The report will relate performance to test takers
102. See NYJoint Hearing, supra note 80, at 123 (testimony of Allan Nairn, Congress Watch
Public Citizen) (explaining that a study of the use and predictive value of the LSAT was
deemed "too sensitive" by the LSAC and was withheld from publication and general circula.
tion upon completion).
103. N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 342 (1) (McKinney 1988) (stating in pertinent part that "tw]ithin
thirty days after the results ofany standardized tests are released, the test agency must file...
a copy of all test questions .... the corresponding correct answers ... and all rules for con-
verting raw scores into those scores reported to the test subject together with an explanation
of such rules").
104. N.Y. Enuc. LAw § 342(1) (McKinney 1988).
105. Minutes of Proceedings, New York Joint Public Hearing of the Senate and Assembly Standing
Committees on Higher Education, Exhibit-E, at 5321-28 (June 14, 1976) (floor statement of Sen.
Kenneth P. Lavalle).
106. Id. at 5326-27 (comparing the test agencies' refusal to reveal standardized tests with
a hypothetical situation involving a college professor who refuses to return tests to his stu-
dents in order for them to understand their mistakes).
107. Id. at 5327.
108. See NI'Joint Hearing, supra note 80, at 37-38 (testimony of Steven Solomon, New York
Public Interest Research Group) (discussing the imperfections in computer scoring tech-
niques and positing that the notice provision of the law would notify test takers of computer
errors so that they could contact law schools). Solomon stated that in the 1975-76 applicant
year:
numerous law school applicants were erroneously designated as unacknowledged re-
peaters. Unacknowledged repeaters are test takers who have taken the law school
admissions test more than once while denying that fact... [on] the information sheet
filled out prior to taking the test. Law schools that received this information were
being told that certain candidates were actually certified liars. No effort was made to
inform those students who might have been denied admission because of this error
that a mistake had been made.
NY Joint Hearing, supra note 80, at 38.
109. N.Y. EDUc. LAW § 341-a (McKinney 1988).
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categorized by race, ethnicity, gender, and linguistic background. 110
Information contained in the report is to be filed with an advisory
committee which will then report to the legislature. 11 This report
is to provide information about race, gender, and/or ethnic per-
formance differentials in the tests.
Finally, the documents filed under the law are now considered
public records." 2 This public record designation assures that the
material will be available to all researchers.
B. The MCAT Court Challenge
One of the prime differences between the New York Truth in
Testing law and its predecessor, the California law, is the require-
ment that actual test questions be disclosed.11 3 This provision be-
came the focus for a court challenge to the New York law. 114 In
1979, the Association of American Medical Colleges11 5 sued the
State of New York claiming that the Truth in Testing law abridged
its copyright interest in the MCAT. 116 The AAMC sued in federal
district court immediately after passage of the New York Act and
prior to the administration of any tests. The Association sought a
preliminary injunction in order to enjoin enforcement of the disclo-
sure provisions as to the MOAT.117 The AAMC informed the court
that the MCAT would not be administered in New York if the in-
junction were not granted. 1 s
This threat was not taken lightly. The district court, in granting
the injunction, noted,
[rihe Commissioner of Education of New York has serious mis-
givings concerning the Testing Law. He has made clear that he
questions whether the Law will serve the purposes for which it was
enacted [specifically regarding cultural bias], that he fears that
many testing agencies will stop giving the tests in New York State,
110. Id.
111. Id
112. Id §§ 341(3), 342(7) (McKinney 1988).
113. Compare N.Y. Enuc. IAw § 342 (McKinney 1988) (requiring disclosure of "all test
questions" used in scoring an examination) with CAL. EDUC. LAW § 99162 (Deering 1993)
(mandating disclosure of "operational test questions").
114. AAMC I, supra note 14, at 1358.
115. The Association of American Medical Colleges is a non-profit organization. At the
time of initiation of the suit, its members included 125 medical schools, 418 teaching hospi-
tals, 68 academic societies, and over 1,700 individuals. AAMC I, supra note 14, at 1359.
116. See AAMC I, supra note 14, at 1361 (alleging that sections 341 and 342 of the Truth
in Testing law violated both the Federal Copyright Act and constitutional rights to due pro-
cess and equal protection). See generally 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1988 & Supp. II 1990) (enumerating
the exclusive rights in copyrighted works).
117. AAMC I,jupra note 14, at 1361 n.7, 1368.
118. AAMC I, supra note 14, at 1361.
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as threatened, or will decrease the number of test administrations
per year, and he is concerned that the price for taking the tests
will increase drastically, all to the detriment of the citizens of New
York State.' 19
In 1980, when the district court issued the preliminary injunction,
it was not unreasonable for Judge McCurn to be concerned about
the effect of the law. However, eight years later, in 1988, when the
AAMC moved for a permanent injunction, the situation was very
different. During the previous eight years, the other test agencies
had voluntarily complied with the law.1 20 Research studies and dis-
closure of questions within this time period did affirmatively reveal
bias in the tests.12 1 The test agencies had changed their "sensitivity
review" processes for catching bias.' 2 2 Contrary to the predictions
of the testing agencies in the early 1980s, the cost of the tests did
not explode as a result of disclosure. Rather, the test agencies pros-
pered financially.' 23 The agencies were able to develop and re-
search new questions for future tests. Through the use of
"equating" questions, the tests from one year were found to be
comparable to those of another.'2 4
Nevertheless, in 1990, now Chief Judge McCurn found that the
AAMC's copyright interest in the MCAT was greater than the public
119. AAMC I, supra note 14, at 1367.
120. See Sewall, supra note 70, at 97 (explaining that while the other testing agencies vigor-
ously opposed the New York law, they may have initially cooperated because they feared the
passage of comprehensive federal legislation).
121. See generally WHITE, EFFCTS OF COACHING, QUESTIONS AND BIAS, supra note 8, at 27-
70 (discussing the processes for identifying potential bias and examples of existing cultural
bias in the LSAT). Researchers linked bias in the test to the enrollment of minorities in law
schools. See, e.g., Eulius Simien, The Law SchoolAdmission TestAs a Barier to Almost Twenty ears of
Affirmative Action, 12 T. MARSHAu.L L. Rzv. 359 (1987) (commenting on how the design of the
LSAT contributed to the failure to increase enrollment of African-Americans in law schools).
122. See Letter from Lizabeth Moody, President, Law School Admission Services (LSAS),
Executive Director, LSAC, to Professor Michael Bums, Editor, SALT EQUALIZER 2 (Apr. 1
1992) (on file with author) [hereinafter Moody letter] (explaining that since 1989 final assem-
bled tests are subjected to a "sensitivity review" to ensure that they comply with ETS Standards
for Quality and Fairness and are further reviewed for sensitivity by the LSAC test development
staff).
123. See Edward B. Fiske, College Testing is a Hard Habit to Break, N.Y. TiMEs,Jan. 15, 1989,
§ 4 at, 28 (stating that ETS ended its 1988 fiscal year having earned $226 million).
124. Equating questions is the process by which test agencies examine and compare ques-
tions from previous years in order to develop future questions. This process ensures consis-
tency and prevents the repetition of questions on standardized tests from year to year. See
LSAT: SOURCES, CoNTErrs, USES, supra note 34, at 4 (explaining the process of question
equating in the context of the LSAT); Edward B. Fiske, Truth-In-Testing- Hows It Working, N.Y.
TMES, Nov. 23, 1980, § 4 at, 9 (reporting that testing agencies' initial fears that problems in
equating questions would destroy the validity of tests proved unfounded). The New York law
directly affected the equating process. See N.Y. EDuc. LAw § 342 (McKinney 1988) (requiring
disclosure of questions actually used in scoring the examination).
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interest in the Truth in Testing law.' 25 ChiefJudge McCurn issued
a permanent injunction. 126 The AAMC's primary argument was that
disclosure made reuse of test questions impossible. If questions
could not be reused, new questions would have to be developed. 127
The AAMC claimed that this would be expensive and that it might
well be impossible.1 28 The AAMC argued that there was a "finite
pool" of possible science and math questions and question stimuli
available that must be kept secure.129 Thus, the AAMC argued that
they would be hurt economcally because they could not reuse ques-
tions and that depleting the pool of possible questions was against
the public interest.130
On appeal to the Second Circuit, the case was remanded.131 The
Second Circuit found that summary judgment was inappropriate. 3 2
The effect of the Truth in Testing law on the market value of the
AAMC's copyright was a material issue of fact. 133 The trier of fact
needed to determine whether questions could be reused and calcu-
late the expense of developing new questions before an injunction
could be granted.134
C. Capyright Analysis
The AAMC argued that the New York Truth in Testing law was
preempted by the Federal Copyright Act, and thus was invalid.' 3 5
Under the Supremacy Clause of Article VI of the United States Con-
stitution, there are three ways in which state law can be preempted.
First, Congress may expressly exclude state regulation.' 36 Second,
125. See AAMC II, supra note 14, at 889 (finding "that the 'disclosure provisions' of the
New York State's Standardized Testing Act, N.Y. Educ. Law §§ 341, 341-a and 342 are pre-
empted due to a direct conflict with Federal Copyright Law"); see also supra note 25 (explaining
Fair Use in copyright law).
126. AAMC II, supra note 14, at 873.
127. AAMC II, supra note 14, at 878. However, it was unclear on the record the extent to
which the MCAT reuses questions. The state submitted the affidavit of Professor Walter Ha-
ney, stating that after a period of years disclosed questions could be reused because the
"pool" of those questions would be so large that access to them would not give a test taker an
unfair advantage. AAMC II, supra note 14, at 878.
128. AAMC H, supra note 14, at 878.
129. AAMC II, supra note 14, at 878.
130. AAMC II, supra note 14, at 887.
131. AAMC III, supra note 14 (reversing the decision of the district court, vacating the
permanent injunction and remanding the case).
132. AAMC I1, supra note 14, at 526.
133. AAMC III, supra note 14, at 526.
134. AAMC III, supra note 14, at 525.
135. AAMC III, supra note 14, at 522.
136. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2, cl.1 (stating in pertinent part: "The Constitution and the
laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or
which shall be made, under authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the
land.").
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Congress may so extensively regulate an area that federal regulation
impliedly leaves no room for, or crowds out, state regulation.' 37
Third, state law may be preempted if it actually conflicts with federal
law.'38 The third kind of preemption is called "conflict preemp-
tion." 3 9 Conflict preemption occurs when compliance with both
state and federal regulations would be impossible, or when the state
law prohibits effectuating federal law policies. 140 Congress has
neither expressly prohibited state regulation of standardized admis-
sions tests nor comprehensively regulated the tests.141 Therefore,
the AAMC had to argue conflict preemption, the third type of pre-
emption. The AAMC claimed that the Truth in Testing law prohib-
ited accomplishing the policies of the Federal Copyright Act and
prevented the copyright holder from receiving the benefits Con-
gress intended.142
What then are the policies behind the copyriglt law? Copyrights
are a protected property right. 43 The copyright interest protects
intellectual property in order to encourage creativity.144 Copyright
protection is justified because it motivates people to continue to cre-
ate, to think, to write, to publish, and to exchange information.
What benefits did Congress intend to confer through the copy-
right law? Authors who hold copyrights receive proper recognition
and financial reward for their work.145 Additionally, publishers can
137. Id.
138. See, e.g. Darling v. Mobil Oil Corp., 864 F.2d 981, 985-86 (2d Cir. 1989) (finding that
the Federal Petroleum Marketing Practices Act preempted a similar Connecticut statute be-
cause the two laws directly conflicted with each other).
139. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2, cl. 1; see, eg., Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S.
225 (1964) (holding that a local unfair competition law conflicted with the power of the fed-
eral government to grant patents and would preclude implementation of federal policy).
140. SIiffel, 376 U.S. at 229.
141. AAMC III, supra note 14, at 527 (Mahoney, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (explaining that there is "no federal regulation of standardized testing that would dis-
place New York's" Truth in Testing law).
142. AAMC III, supra note 14, at 523.
143. See generally 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1988 & Supp. II 1990) (enumerating categories of the
general subject matter of copyright); NIMMER, supra note 25, at 1-44.15 § 103[A] (comparing
copyright to the theory of private property).
144. See Maxtone-Graham v. Burtchaell, 803 F.2d 1253, 1255 (2d Cir. 1986), cerl. denied,
481 U.S. 1059 (1987) (holding that verbatim copying of a book was justified as Fair Use under
the Copyright Act since the "purpose of fair use is to create a limited exception to the individ-
ual's property rights in his (or her] expression - rights conferred to encourage creativity."); see
also Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417,450 (1984) ("the purpose
of copyright is to create incentives for creative effort.").
145. See generally 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1988 & Supp. 11 1990) (explaining authors' exclusive
rights in copyrighted works); see, e.g., Mazer v. Stein 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954) (stating that
copyright encourages individual creativity by extending financial personal gain); Harper &
Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 55 (1985) (explaining that one of the
primary goals of the Copyright Act is to assure recognition to authors and reporters).
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also profit.146 Profit encourages publication and thus increases
availability of information to the public. Without copyright, impor-
tant ideas might never gain public attention. 147 The concept of
copyright protection is founded upon encouraging creativity and
enhancing public knowledge.
Copyright protection, however, has never been absolute. There is
a tension between reward for creativity on the one hand and availa-
bility and public use of copyrighted material on the other. Copy-
right can be used to monopolize ideas and thus inhibit the exchange
of information at a potentially great social cost. 148 In other words,
copyright protection at times may be counterproductive to the poli-
cies justifying its existence. 149 Because of this potential conflict, ex-
ceptions to exclusive copyrights have existed for over 250 years.' 50
1. The Fair Use Exception to Copyright Protection
The most important of the exceptions to exclusive copyright is
known as the Fair Use Doctrine.' 51 At common law, the Fair Use
Doctrine existed as an "equitable rule of reason."' 52 The Doctrine
allows use of copyrighted material without the copyright owner's
consent in circumstances when the use is reasonable, and when the
use "would tip the balance between the public interest in the free
flow of information and the copyright holder's exclusive control
over the work in favor of the public."'- 53
This is not an easy balance to strike.1 54 Justice Story explicated
146. See Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 567 (describing the Copyright Act's focus on the
importance of ensuring marketability of copyrighted work).
147. See, eg., Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975) (stating
that the "ultimate aim" of copyright law is "to stimulate artistic activity for the general public
good.").
148. Id.
149. See Iowa State Univ. Research Found., Inc. v. American Broadcasting Cos., Inc., 621
F.2d 57, 60 (2d Cir. 1980) (stating that the "doctrine of fair use permits courts to avoid rigid
application of the copyright statute when, on occasion, it would stifle the very creativity which
the law is designed to foster.").
I50. See Gyles v. Wilcox, 2 Atk. 141 (1740) (No. 130) (defining abridgement of the right
to use copyrighted material because ofpublic considerations); see also Frank D. Prager, History
ofIntelleclual Properly, 26J. PAT. [& TRADEmARk] OFF. Soc'Y 711 (1944) (recounting the history
of copyright).
151. See supra note 25.
152. H.R. Rep. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 65 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5659 (reporting on the legislative history of the Copyright Act).
153. DC Comics Inc. v. Reel Fantasy, Inc., 696 F.2d 24, 27 (2d Cir. 1982).
154. In 1939, a panel of the Second Circuit, including Judge Learned Hand, called the
issue of Fair Use "the most troublesome in the whole law of copyright." Dellar v. Samuel
Goldwyn, Inc., 104 F.2d 661, 662 (2d Cir. 1939) (per curiam). It remains so today. See
Weinreb, supra note 25, at 1144 (discussing the difficulty in ascertaining use as a public or
private interest);Jay Dratler, Distilling the Witches Brew of Fair Use in Copyright Law, 43 U. MTAMt
L. REv. 233, 250 (1988) (addressing the conflict between the public's right to know and pri-
vacy interests).
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the operation of the doctrine in 1841: "We must often look to the
nature and objects of the selections made, the quantity and value of
the materials used, and the degree in which the use may prejudice
the sale or diminish the profits, or supersede the objects of the orig-
inal work." 15-5
In 1976, Congress passed a comprehensive, new Copyright Act' 5 6
that codified existing statutory copyright law and the substantial
body of common law. 157 At the same time Congress formalized
copyright protection, it also recognized the fundamental tension be-
tween monopoly and access in copyright law by codifying the Fair
Use Doctrine in section 107 of the Copyright Act. 158 This section
was intended to "restate the presentjudicial doctrine of fair use, not
to change, narrow or enlarge it in any way." ' 159
Section 107 is basically a restatement of Justice Story's descrip-
tion of Fair Use. In its entirety it reads:
Not withstanding the provisions of sections 106 and 106A, the fair
use of a copyrighted work, including such use by reproduction in
copies or phonorecords or by any other means specified by that
section, for the purposes such as criticism, comment, news report-
ing, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), schol-
arship or research is not an infringement of copyright. In
determining whether the use made of a work in any particular case
is a fair use the factors to be considered shall include-
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether
such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational
purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in rela-
tion to the copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market or value of
the copyrighted work. 160
The criteria set out in section 107 should be applied on a case-by-
case basis.' 61 Although the contextual nature of the Fair Use Doc-
155. Folsum v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 345 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4, 901).
156. Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 94-533, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810
(1988 & Supp. III 1991)).
157. See Notes of Committee of theJudidary House Report No. 94-1476, Single Federal
System, Historical Note, 17 U.S.C.A. § 301 (West 1977) (explaining that the Copyright Act
had changed what had been a "dual system of 'common law copyright' for unpublished works,
... the system in effect in the United States since the first copyright statute in 1790 ...
158. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1988 & Supp. 111990).
159. H.R. Rep. No. 1476, supra note 152, at 66, repinted in U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5679.
160. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1988 & Supp. I 1990).
161. See Harper& Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539,560 (1985) ("The
factors enumerated in [section 107] are not meant to be exclusive: '[s]ince the doctrine is an
equitable rule of reason, no generally applicable definition is possible, and each case raising
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trine has always been a challenge,162 there is ambiguity in using spe-
cific case analysis. It is difficult to predict if the exception will apply
in any given situation. 163 Nevertheless, case-by-case analysis is es-
sential. The Doctrine arises in varied situations and there must be
flexibility in its application. Rote application of the Fair Use criteria
is too dangerous. However, regardless of the difficulty in applying
the Fair Use Doctrine, its goal of resolving the conflict between the
monopoly granted to the owner of the copyright and the free flow of
information, serves to foster a creative and informed society. This
goal is important in the arena of standardized testing.
a.) The Purpose of the Use
Section 107 lists "the purpose of the use" as the first criterion for
claiming Fair Use exemption from copyright.' 6r When applying this
first prong of the Fair Use Doctrine the distinction between com-
mercial use and non-profit use must be recognized. There is no
doubt that Truth in Testing laws fall within the parameters of the
exception for non-profit use. The disclosure provisions are aimed
at teaching, scholarship, and research. Truth in Testing laws were
passed because of the need for meaningful comment and criticism in
this area with regard to standardized tests. The Truth in Testing
law provides for the use of copyrighted material for non-profit, edu-
cational purposes only. It is not for commercial purposes, profit, or
exploitation. 65
b.) The Nature of the Work
The second criterion for determining Fair Use is the nature of the
copyrighted work.' 66 The AAMC, like most test agencies, regularly
question must be decided on its own facts.' "); see also Iowa State Univ. Research Found., Inc.
v. American Broadcasting Cos., Inc., 621 F.2d 57, 60 (2d Cir. 1980) ("[The] resolution of a
fair use claim 'depends on an examination of the facts in each case' ")(citation omitted).
162. See generally Weinreb, supra note 25, at 1137 (1990) (commenting on the "confused"
Doctrine of Fair Use).
163. See Maxtone-Graham v. Burtchaell, 803 F.2d 1253 (2d Cir. 1986) (exemplifying the
unpredictability of the Fair Use Doctrine where verbatim copying of interviews published in a
pro-choice book by an author of an antiabortion book was justified).
164. 17 U.S.C. § 107(1) (1988 & Supp. II 1990).
165. See AAMC III, supra note 14, at 524 ("The State does not seek to exploit disclosed
MCAT materials commercially .... This conclusion is essentially uncontested by the parties
...... ). Though disclosure might result in commercial use of questions by test preparation
services or test "coaching" businesses, this would be a commercial use also subject to copy-
right protection. Additionally, hypothetical infringing uses should not render the non-profit,
Truth in Testing use a copyright infringement either. See Sony Corp. v. Universal Studios,
Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 454-56 (1984) (stating that the possibility that VCRs are capable of infring-
ing uses does not support a finding of copyright infringement because the VCRs are also
capable of substantial non-infringing uses).
166. 17 U.S.C. § 107(2) (1988).
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files for and receives copyrights for its tests. 167 The MCAT consists
of science and math questions. 68 The factual nature of the MOAT
material generally would afford it less copyright protection because
a higher value is placed on copyrighted fiction than on nonfiction.
As one court noted, "Factual works such as biographies, reviews,
criticism and commentary are believed to have greater public value
and, therefore, uses of them may be better tolerated by the copy-
right law."' 169 Normally, "no author may copyright facts or
ideas."' 70 Yet, while the MOAT, like other admissions tests, is less
than great literature, it is more than pure fact.'7 1 The test involves
compilation and presentation of facts within the vehicle of the ques-
tion stimulus or fact pattern. Questions are ordered by design.
There is, therefore, a creative aspect to the test. This creative aspect
must, however, be balanced with the public interest in disclosing the
"objective" test questions and test agency factual, research reports.
Test agencies have successfully argued that their tests are pro-
tected by copyright because of the "secure" nature of the test mate-
rial.172 The AAMC in 1983, and ETS in 1986, sued for commercial
infringement of their "secure" admissions tests.' 73 However, both
these law suits involved use of tests by commercial test "coaching"
167. AAMC III, supra note 14, at 521.
168. See AAMC III, supra note 14, at 521 (explaining that the MCAT consists "of some
300 questions and is designed to measure a test-taker's knowledge in chemistry, biology, and
physics, as well as his or her reading and quantitative skills.").
169. Basic Book, Inc. v. Kinko's Graphic Corp., 758 F. Supp. 1522, 1532-33 (S.D.N.Y.
1991) (holding that a duplication business had infringed publishers' copyrights by copying
excerpts from books without permission and compiling them into university report packets).
170. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 547 (1985). See
American Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 61 U.S.L.W. 2066,2067 (S.D.N.Y.July 22, 1992)
(stating that the factual nature of a work weighs in favor of Fair Use, but finding that the
commercial nature of the user and harm to profits led to copyright infringement).
171. See American Geophysical Union, 61 U.S.L.W. at 2066 (explaining that less protection is
afforded work that is non-fiction to the extent that non-fiction work does not require creativ-
ity, but finding even purely factual work may be creative and protected by copyright where the
compilation and presentation are creative).
172. See National Conference of Bar Examiners v. Multistate Legal Studies, 692 F.2d 478,
484 n.6 (7th Cir. 1982) (interpreting Congress's intent in creating the Copyright Act to "af-
ford protection to confidential creative material such as secure tests.. . ."); see also 37 C.F.R.
§ 202.20(c)(2)(vi) (1991) (obviating the need for the Copyright Office to retain a copy of"se-
cure" tests after the administration of the exam).
173. See American Assoc. of Medical Colleges v. Mikaelian, 571 F. Supp. 144, 155 (E.D.
Pa. 1983) (commenting that the reuse of old sequred test questions saves expense to AAMC
and its member medical schools and granting a preliminary injunction to prevent a test prepa-
ration business from using AAMC questions in its materials), affd without opinion, 734 F.2d 3
(3d Cir. 1984); see also Educational Testing Serv. v. Katzman, 631 F. Supp. 550 (D.NJ. 1986)
(holding that the court hadjurisdiction over a review course corporation officer); Educational
Testing Serv. v. Katzman, 793 F.2d 533 (3d Cir. 1986) (upholding an injunction against a test
preparation course). The legal battles between Katzman and ETS date back to 1983, when
ETS discovered that Katzman was registering for and taking several ETS examinations in
order to become more familiar with them. Id. at 536.
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groups. In AAMG v. Mikaeian,174 the defendant's coaching classes
used verbatim questions from MCAT tests that were thought to be
secure. 175 The defendant had taken the MCAT on numerous occa-
sions. His answer sheets for the tests were virtually empty. It ap-
peared that he would sign up to take the test for the purpose of
copying actual test questions and then would use them in his coach-
ing classes.' 76 The students in the defendant's coaching courses
benefitted from an obvious advantage.177 The court in Mikaelian re-
fused to apply the Fair Use exception because of the commercial
nature of the use and the unfairness to test takers who were not in
the coaching course.' 78
Likewise, in ETS v. Katzman,179 the test agency sued a commercial
defendant who had somehow obtained a copy of various standard-
ized tests before they were used for actual testing.'80 Again, the
courts found that such a use was not a Fair Use at all, but rather
against public policy.'81 It was unfair to students not in the course,
and indeed distorted the whole testing process.18 2
Truth in Testing Fair Use is very different from selected exploita-
tion of tests for commercial benefit by coaching services. The na-
ture of the MCAT as a secure copyrighted work should be viewed in
relationship to the Truth in Testing law. Certainly test agencies
should be able to use copyright laws to protect themselves from use
of tests such as that in Katzman. Copyright protection is needed to
safeguard the tests as unpublished works prior to their administra-
tion.'8 3 The tests are more than raw facts. If a test taker knew ex-
actly what questions would be asked and the order in which they
would appear, answers could be memorized and the test would not
be a test at all. On the other hand, disclosure after the test has been
174. 571 F. Supp 144 (E.D. Pa. 1983).
175. Id. at 148 ("Many ofthe Multiprep [Mikaelian's company] test questions are not only
word-for-word reproductions of the MCAT test question, but also have the same typeface and
graphic irregularities [e.g. an uneven line] found on the MCAT question.").
176. Id. at 147-48.
177. Id. at 153.
178. Id.
179. 631 F. Supp. 550 (D.NJ. 1986).
180. See id. at 551 (explaining that in 1982, Katzman obtained copies of the English and
Math Achievement tests before the exams were administered and distributed them, causing
ETS to cancel all students' scores and readminister the tests); see also Daniel S. Hinerfeld,
Cheating Time, ROLLING STONE, Mar. 19, 1992 at 74 (postulating that Katzman and his cohorts
would make use of time zone changes to transmit questions and answers from East Coast to
West Coast test takers).
181. Katzman, 793 F.2d at 543.
182. Id.
183. See Mikaelian, 571 F. Supp. at 153 ("[IThe development, testing, and administration
of the questions [are] performed under strict scrutiny. The very purpose of copyrighting the
MCAT questions is to prevent their use as teaching aids .... ").
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given has distinct fairness advantages. The primary disadvantage is
that if questions are disclosed, there is a potential that the questions
cannot be used in subsequent tests.'8 4 Yet, if the pool of previously
used questions was large enough, it would be nearly impossible to
memorize all the answers if the questions were disclosed.'85 The
format and order of the questions could be changed in order to alter
the test.186 Additionally, new questions could be written and kept
secure until their use.
c.) The Extent of the Use
The third factor of the Fair Use Exception, the amount of the pro-
tected material used, also has to be viewed within the context of the
Truth in Testing law. 18 7 The Truth in Testing law requires that all
test questions and answers actually used in scoring must be dis-
closed.18 8 On the other hand, questions used for equating or devel-
opment purposes do not have to be disclosed. 8 9 Likewise, the
Truth in Testing law does not require disclosure of the test before it
is given. 190 In this way, the law strikes a balance between strong
public interest in monitoring this widely used type of test and the
equally strong interest in fairly developing and administering admis-
sions tests. In utilizing these balancing factors the law does not seek
to ban the tests, but strives to make them better.
d.) The Economic Effect of the Use
The final factor in the analysis of Fair Use is the effect of the use
on the potential market value of the copyrighted material.191 This
factor is viewed by courts as the most important in determining Fair
Use.'9 2 A copyright holder can argue against Fair Use by showing
184. AAMC III, supra note 14, at 525.
185. AAMC III, supra note 14, at 525 (discussing a study on disclosure of standardized
testing questions finding that, over time, the effect of test disclosure on test scores becomes
negligible).
186. AAMC III, supra note 14, at 525 (describing how mathematical adjustments in the
value of test questions reduces any scoring deviations).
187. 17 U.S.C. § 107(3).
188. N.Y. EDuc. LAw § 342(1) (McKinney 1988).
189. N.Y. EDuc. LAW § 342(1)(a) (McKinney 1988). For the test taker, these questions
might be as distracting and biased as questions used for scoring. Nevertheless, this exemp-
tion in the Truth in Testing law seems a reasonable balance with the interests of the agencies
developing and administering standardized tests. This may also help the testing agencies to
discern which types of questions, in fact, are distracting to the test taker if they are allowed to
add non-scored experimental questions.
190. I. §§ 340, 341(1) (McKinney 1988).
191. 17 U.S.C. § 107(4).
192. See Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters. 471 U.S. 539, 566 (1985)
(describing the impact on the potential market as "undoubtedly the single most important
element of Fair Use."). There has also been a scholarly critique of the Court's emphasis on
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that the excepted use would have a negative effect on the profitabil-
ity of the copyrighted work.193 However, negative effect alone is not
enough. To prevent application of the Fair Use exception, any ad-
verse effect on the value or profitability of the work must outweigh
any benefit to the public if the Fair Use is permitted.1 94
Test agencies must demonstrate that the Fair Use would cause
profit loss.19 5 In evaluating the impact on profits of any Fair Use of
copyrighted material the commercial/nonprofit distinction is again
important19 6 The Supreme Court has stated, "If the intended use
is for commercial gain, that likelihood [of economic harm] may be
presumed. But if it is for a non-commercial purpose, the likelihood
must be demonstrated." 197 It is not enough for test agencies to
demonstrate profit loss under their current way of operating. In re-
sponse to this assertion a court might hold that they would have to
alter their business operations to mitigate the Fair Use harm.19 8
To challenge the Truth in Testing law, the AAMC brought forth
several claims. They argued that Truth in Testing harmed the value
of their copyright because questions could not be reused.19 9 They
also claimed that the cost of writing new questions would be exces-
sive.200 As a direct result of implementation of truth in testing pro-
cedures, they claimed that their profit would be effectively
eroded.201 The AAMC also asserted that disclosure might eliminate
the ability to produce even a very expensive test because there is a
economic factors to the exclusion of equity and policy issues. See Weinreb, supra note 25, at
137 (posing a broader, contextualized approach for Fair Use analysis and rejecting the limited
utilitarian type of analysis); Leval, supra note 25, at 1105 (presenting a traditional utilitarian
analysis of Fair Use concepts).
193. Harper &Row, 471 U.S. at 539. The Court provided an example of this type of Fair
Use analysis where former President Ford claimed that a portion of his yet unpublished
memoirs printed in The Nation Magazine violated the Copyright Act by reducing the poten-
tial market value of his memoirs. Id. at 548-55.
194. MCA, Inc. v. Wilson, 677 F.2d 180, 183 (2d Cir. 1981).
195. See AAMC III, supra note 14, at 525-26 (describing the court's reaction to the claim of
loss of profits asserted by AAMC). The court stated, "Moreover, we reject the district court's
conclusion that a copyright owner, such as AAMC, should not be 'required to change its oper-
ations when another individual or entity is interfering with its ownership rights under the
Federal Copyright Act in order to make the fair use exception fit.' "AAMC III, supra note 14,
at 525-26 (citation omitted). Additionally, courts have also held that a copyright owner may
be required to take certain steps to avoid profit loss. AAMC III, supra note 14, at 525-26.
196. See AAMC III, supra note 14, at 523 (citing section 107 of the Copyright Act as re-
quiring assessment of whether the use is for commercial or non-profit educational uses).
197. Sony Corp. v. Universal Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 451 (1984).
198. See AAMC III, supra note 14, at 525-26 (describing situations where the copyright
owner might be required to make accommodation for Fair Use).
199. AAMC III, supra note 14, at 522. But see AAMC III, supra note 14, at 525 (disputing
the AAMC's claim that reuse of MCAT test questions was impossible).
200. See AAMC II, supra note 14, at 887 ("The plaintiff also maintains, and defendants do
not dispute, that the development of effective questions costs a good deal of both time and
money-an investment which would be lost with disclosure.").
201. AAMC II, supra note 14, at 887.
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finite number of possible science and math questions that could be
asked. 20 2 This would both hurt the public interest in having admis-
sions tests and eliminate the market for their test.
The AAMC's assertion of economic harm is difficult to fathom.
The AAMC and the other test agencies are monopolies. They can
charge whatever they choose for the costs of administering admis-
sions tests.2 03 The market for medical school standardized admis-
sions tests is absolutely captive. A person wishing to be admitted to
medical school can go nowhere else to obtain this necessity. The
AAMC, like the LSAG which administers the LSAT, gives itself a
monopoly when acting for individual member schools. The same
educational institutions which use the test information for admis-
sion purposes have banded together to form the AAMC and the
LSAG. 20 4 Furthermore, the cost of question development and new
test production for each series of administrations 20 5 may not be
high.20 6 Certainly the ten years of experience with disclosure would
seem to indicate that new questions can be drafted without exces-
sive cost.2 0 7
202. AAMC II, supra note 14, at 878.
203. See David M. White, Brief of Testing for the Public, Puerto Rican Legal Defense and
Education Fund, United States Students Association, and the Equality in Testing Project as
Amici Curiae, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, at 18-20, AAMC v. Cuomo 928
F.2d 519 (2d Cir. 1991) (No. 90-7269) (stating that standardized test makers have a monopoly
over this type of testing and thus have the ability to regulate prices at their discretion); see also,
AAMC III, supra note 14, at 521 (noting that almost all medical schools in the United States
require applicants to take and pass the MCAT which is produced by AAMC).
204. See AAMC I, supra note 14, at 1359 (explaining that the AAMC is comprised of over
125 medical schools, 418 teaching hospitals, 68 academic societies, and over 1700 individu-
als); see also LSAT INFO. BOOK 92-93, supra note 2 (describing the history and composition of
standardized testing and explaining that virtually every ABA and AALS accredited and unac-
credited law school in the United States is a member of the LSAC).
205. A new test would not have to be developed for each administration of the MCAT. See
N.Y. EDUc. LAw § 342(1) (McKinney 1988) (explaining that admissions tests are usually ad-
ministered in clusters over the calendar year in coordination with professional school applica-
tion processes, and providing that substantial delay in reporting of scores after administration
must be disclosed). The New York law established that disclosure of test questions by the test
agency does not have to occur until 30 days after announcing test results. Id. This lag time
allows for a number of administrations of the same test before it is disclosed.
206. See Fiske, supra note 124, § 4, at 9 (reporting that an ETS official indicated that the
additional cost of disclosing the SAT nationwide could be kept to 30 cents per test given).
Additionally, during the Joint Hearings on New York's Truth in Testing law, there was testi-
mony that test questions generally cost between 21 cents and 42 cents per candidate to de-
velop. See NYJoint Hearing, supra note 80, at 127-131 (testimony of Allan Nairn, Congress
Watch Public Citizen) (noting that internal industry estimates for test development costs were
inconsistent with the studies of cost disclosure done by ETS); AAMC 1, supra note 14, joint
app. at 15 (affidavit of Karen Mitchell, Director, MCAT Program) (on file with FairTest, Na-
tional Center for Fair & Open Testing, Cambridge, Mass.) (explaining that each MCAT test
forms costs $215,000 to develop; each question on a test form costs $705 for multiple choice
and $39,000 for essay questions).
207. Not only have test agencies been able to draft new questions at little expense, but
they have also profited by the publication and sale of disclosed tests. See MarkJ. Sherman, The
College Board Joins Publishers of S.A.T. "Cram" Books, N.Y. TIMES, January 8, 1984, § 12 at 8
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The policy behind copyright protection is encouragement of crea-
tivity and increased information. 208 The anomaly of the AAMC's
claim for protection is that it is founded on a desire not to be crea-
tive. If questions are disclosed, the AAMC urges, they cannot be
reused. They seek copyright protection to avoid any further creativ-
ity. The purpose of disclosure is to encourage the continued crea-
tion of better tests. The AAMC wants to have a static test, given
without outside scrutiny.
Disclosure will not hurt the test agencies' profits or creativity. Ad-
ditionally, it serves a significant public purpose. Disclosure leads to
better tests, particularly in terms of confronting race, ethnic, and
gender bias. For example, the LSAC has had a sensitivity review
process for decades. 20 9 In 1989, after the exposure of offensive
questions, 210 the LSAC instituted a new sensitivity review
process. 211
2. Judicial Treatment of Fair Use in Truth in Testing
The Fair Use Doctrine is to be applied contextually. The courts
should examine the public interest in any individual case to the
same extent that they examine potential harm to the copyright
(revealing the College Board's reluctant admission that preparation for standardized testing
can be beneficial to the test takers and discussing the Board's profitable sale of test prepara-
tion material). The financial hardiness of the LSAC and the LSAT post-Truth in Testing is
evident by the efforts made in the late 1980s by for-profit entrepreneurs to purchase and
operate the LSAT. See Victor G. Rosenblum, Complementary Concerns About Legal Education: No
Buyout or Sellout, AssocATmioN OF AzERMAN LAW ScHooLs NEWSLEMrR, June 1987 at 2 (dis-
cussing the attempted purchase of Law School Admission Services, Inc., a subsidiary of LSAC,
and the ensuing resolution by LSAC which rejected this offer of purchase).
208. See Sony Corp. v. Universal Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984) (stating that the
purpose of the Copyright Act is not, ".. .primarily ... to provide a special private benefit,"
but is to benefit the public by, "motivat[ing] the creative activity of the authors and inventors
by the provision of special reward, and to allow the public access to the products of their
genius. ... ." and discussing the intention of monopoly privileges authorized by Congress
through the Copyright Act).
209. See Moody letter, supra note 122, at 1:
"[From the early 1980s], [i]n addition to the standard item-bias and other psycho-
metric reviews, test specialists, minority consultants, and a Test Question Review
Committee of law school volunteers conducted reviews of test items; however, once
assembled into a test form, these questions did not receive additional sensitivity
review."
210. See, eg., supra notes 51, 54, 55, 64, 68 and accompanying text (providing examples
and analysis of offensive questions).
211. See Moody letter, supra note 122, at 2:
"[Since 1989], LSAS has broadened the test-review process beyond the basic item-
bias review to ensure that tests do not include inappropriate or offensive material
and that they do include a balance of material recognizing the diversity of our society
and the contributions of women and minorities."
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owner.2 2 Neither the district court213 nor the Second Circuit214 in
the AAMC case acknowledged the nexus between disclosure and
amelioration of race and sex bias in standardized tests. In order to
eliminate these biases, it is necessary to disclose actual test ques-
tions and internal test agency research reports.
ChiefJudge McCurn, in the district court opinion, recognized the
state interest in eliminating race and gender bias in testing only re-
garding the mandated data collection in section 341-a.215 In detail-
ing the provisions of the New York law, ChiefJudge McCurn noted
that the law was amended in 1987 to include section 341-a "[d]ue to
a concern that standardized tests may be biased in some manner
.... "216 The provision requires that test agencies collect data and
file statistical reports correlating performance with race, language,
ethnicity, and gender.217 However, this section of the law has noth-
ing to do with disclosure of copyrighted questions. 218 ChiefJudge
McCurn was silent regarding race and gender bias and the disclo-
sure of test questions and research reports.
Like ChiefJudge McCurn, Judge Altimari, writing for the Second
Circuit, focused mainly on the effect of the law on the AAMC. 219
His discussion of the state's interest is presented in the vaguest
terms. Judge Altimari noted that the law was enacted "in order to
open the standardized testing process to public scrutiny." 220 He as-
serted that its purpose is to review the validity and objectivity of the
tests, to assure accuracy in scoring and to aid in development of
better fature tests. 22' However, there was no discussion of the leg-
212. See United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 158 (1948) (quoting
ChiefJustice Hughes in Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1931)). Justice Hughes
stated, "The sole interest of the United States and the primary object in conferring the [copy-
right] monopoly lie in the general benefits derived by the public from the labors of authors."
Id. at 158.
213. AAMC II, supra note 14, at 873.
214. AAMC III, supra note 14, at 519.
215. AAMC II,supra note 14, at 884-85 (citingN.Y. EDUC. LAW § 341-a (McKinney 1988)).
216. AAMC II, supra note 14, at 875 (emphasis added).
217. N.Y. Enuc. LAw § 341-a (McKinney 1988).
218. Indeed, under copyright analysis it is difficult to see how section 341-a was even
properly under review by the district court. This section mandates that data be collected and
disclosed, not that independently created and copyrighted material be disclosed. Judge Ma-
honey makes this point in his concurrence to the circuit court opinion. AAMC III, supra note
14, at 536 (Mahoney, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
219. AAMC III, supra note 14, at 519 (reversing the summary judgment and permanent
injunction and remanding case for a determination of whether disclosure of STA [Standard-
ized Testing Act] affected the "potential market for or value of MCATs ... .
220. AAMC III, supra note 14, at 521.
221. AAMC III, supra note 14, at 524.
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islative history of the Act222 nor any mention of the relationship be-
tween disclosure and efforts to eliminate race and gender bias in the
examinations. 223 Both the district court and the Second Circuit
should have noted that section 341-a expresses the significant legis-
lative concern about bias. It bears on interpreting the public inter-
est in the test and research report disclosure provisions of the
law.2 24
The Truth in Testing law is not just about computer scoring er-
rors. It also was passed because test agencies failed to address con-
cers of race and gender bias on their own.225 Yet, the public
interest in equality of opportunity for education was ignored by the
courts responsible for reviewing the law.
III. THE NEED FOR CONTINUED DISCLOSURE.
A. Test Agencies Should Be Forced to Open the Test Process.
The Truth in Testing law was the impetus for disclosure.226
When the Truth in Testing law became effective in 1980, the Educa-
tional Testing Service (ETS), the leader in standardized admissions
tests, did not challenge the law in court. 22 7 ETS complied by dis-
closing all required tests and answers. 228 The LSAC, like most
other test agencies, also complied with the law.229
Nevertheless, the test agency commitment to full test disclosure is
tenuous. For some testing agencies, the issuance of the permanent
injunction by the New York District Court in 1990 led to a return to
secret testing. The Graduate Management Admission Council
(GMAC), which develops the admissions tests used by business
schools, was one of five testing agencies that challenged New York's
Truth in Testing law in 1990 and sought to permanently enjoin en-
222. Additionally, in the district court opinion,Judge McCurn also ignores the context in
which the Act was passed. See AAMC II, supra note 14, at 877-81 (discussing only the adminis-
tration and security of the MCAT and the alleged inability to reuse questions).
223. AAMC II, supra note 14, at 519. Judge Mahoney at least notes that the issue of reuse
of questions is unrelated to this provision of the law. AAMC III, supra note 14, at 526
(Mahoney, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
224. N.Y. EDuc. LAW § 341-a (McKinney 1988).
225. See supra notes 95-112 and accompanying text (discussing the background and devel-
opment of New York's Truth in Testing law).
226. Kevin Sack,Judge Strikes Down Law Fordng Release of College Tests, N.Y. TiMEs, Jan. 19,
1990, at B1.
227. Id
228. Id.
229. Cf Jonathan Rowe, A Tale of Two Tests: SAT vs. LSAT, THE CHRnSTM SCIENCE MONI-
TOR,July 27, 1987, at 21 (discussing the different philosophies of ETS and LSAC regarding
disclosure).
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forcement of the law as applied to them.230 Following initiation of
this suit, all of the plaintiffs, except the GMAC, moved for a prelimi-
nary injunction. 231 This motion was then resolved by a stipulation
specifying which tests, or test questions, would be disclosed.232 The
stipulation, however, did not represent full compliance with the
Truth in Testing law.233 The stipulation was to expire at the end of
the 1990-91 test year or when the AAMC litigation was com-
pleted.234 Due to the length of the .AAMC proceedings, the issue
was extended into the 1991-92 test year.23 5 All of the plaintiffs, ex-
cept the GMAC agreed to an extension of the stipulation.236 The
GMAC chose to file a motion for a preliminary injunction instead.237
Chief Judge McCurn, ruling after the Second Circuit remand of
the AAMC case, refused to preliminarily enjoin the law.238 Chief
judge McCurn found that the state had raised triable issues about
the applicability of the Fair Use Doctrine.23 9 However, the outcome
of the original action, AAMC v. Carey,240 which was remanded to the
district court after the decision was appealed in the Second Circuit,
may bring the return of secret testing. The case, on the remand, is
still in the discovery stage.24 1
Test agencies which have not directly challenged the law, like ETS
and LSAC, may jump on the bandwagon if the law is struck down
with reference to the AAMC. When interviewed, Stanford H. von
Mayrhauser, General Counsel for ETS, stated that the testing ser-
vice continues to believe that "in general, disclosure is a positive
230. College Enu-ance Exam. Bd. v. Cuomo, 788 F. Supp. 134, 137-38 (N.D.N.Y. 1992)(reviewing the history of the case). The other plaintiffs in the case were the Graduate Record
Examination Board, the Test of English as a Foreign Language Policy Council, and the Educa-
tional Testing Service. Id at 134.
231. I, at 137-38.
232. Id at 138 (citing the Stipulation Agreement of Parties, dated May 11, 1990). The
stipulation expressed the plaintiffs' agreement to disclose a certain percentage of tests admin-
istered. Id The GMAC, although it was not a moving party, also agreed to the stipulations.
Id
233. See Id at 138, n.4 (noting that the plaintiffs did not agree to disclose all of their tests).
234. Id
235. Id
236. Id. (citing Stipulation Agreement of Parties, dated January 12, 1992). The stipula-
tion reflected the plaintiffs' agreement to continue disclosing their tests at the same rates as
they had done in the 1990-91 test year. Id
237. Id.
238. College Entrance Exam. Bd., 788 F. Supp. at 134 (denying GMAC's motion for a prelim-
inary injunction for failing to show a likelihood of prevailing on the merits of a claim pre-
empted by the Federal Copyright Act; holding that the use of the test was not within the Fair
Use exception).
239. Id at 140-43.
240. AAMC II, supra note 14, at 873.
241. Discovery in this case has been extended to May 1, 1993. As of publication of this
article, no trial date has been set.
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concept." 242 Mayrhauser implied that it is still possible that ETS
could change its national policy: "If you're looking for a categorical
denial that we won't seek to avail ourselves of any remedies made
available to us by this ruling, I won't deny that. ,,"243
The LSAC, which did not join the GMAG in its direct challenge to
the law, has also entered into a stipulation with the State of New
York.244 The LSAG stipulated to defer disclosure and filing of
LSAT tests it administered in December 1992 and December 1993,
along with any studies, evaluations, and reports, for two years from
the date the tests are administered. 245 The LSAC entered into this
stipulation at about the same time that it began using a new LSAT
format.246 The format is even more important now because, at the
time of the format change, the LSAC also changed-the scoring of the
test.247
In the last eight years, there have been three different methods
used by LSAC to score the LSAT.248 There is no doubt that scoring
affects admissions. The test appears to be a sensitive measure be-
tween students with small score differentials. Depending on the
year the students took the examination, a comparison of two stu-
dents with very similar scores might appear very different. With the
new scoring of 120 to 180,249 the increase in calibrations makes
small score differences appear more significant. The LSAG itself
has acknowledged that a three digit scoring system is misleading.250
The distinctions between any of these score groupings is decep-
tive. Any individual score reflects a broad range of accuracy, called
242. Sack, supra note 226, at BI.
243. Sack, supra note 226, at BI.
244. See Stipulation of Parties, dated January 21, 1992 (on file with FairTest, National
Center for Fair & Open Testing, Cambridge, Mass.) (articulating the provisions of the agree-
ment between LSAC and the State of New York).
245. Id.
246. See LSAT: SouREs, Coms, USES supra note 34, at 5 (describing the new ISAT
format introduced injune, 1991).
247. See ILSAT: SOURCES, CoNrENTs, USES, supra note 34, at 10 (discussing the change in
the scoring of the LSAT; stating that the revised version of the test cannot be equated with the
previous version because the new format "does not test exactly the same qualities in the same
way as they were tested by earlier versions.").
248. Until 1982, scoring was on a 200 to 800 scale. In 1982, scoring changed to a scale of
10 to 48. In 1990, it changed a third time to a scale of 120 to 180. The LSAC distributes
guides to the law schools for comparing scores for years with different scoring tables. LSAT:
SouRCES, CoNTNrrs, USES, supra note 34, at 9-10.
249. See LSAT: SOURCES, CoNrrrs, UsEs, supra note 34, at 10 (explaining the new scor-
ing system).
250. See Beth Bogart, Law Schools Adjust to New LSATScoring System, LEGAL TIMES, Dec. 31,
1984, at 6 (quoting LSAC Deputy Executive Director, Paul Richard). Richard stated that the
LSAC changed in 1982 from a three-digit scoring to a two-digit scoring in part because the
three-digit scoring gave a "misleading appearance of precision." Id.; see also LSAT: SOURCES,
CoNrENTS, USES, supra note 34, at 9 (acknowledging that a three digit score scale created "an
impression of precision that was not warranted.").
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the measurement error. The Standard Error of Measurement
(SEM) for the LSAT is approximately 2.5 scaled points.251 The
LSAC describes the accuracy of the score as follows:
The chances are 2 out of 3 that an individual's test score is within
one SEM of his or her hypothetical "true" score and nine out of
ten that it is within two SEMS. A test taker's true score is the
score he or she would obtain on a perfectly reliable test. When
the SEM is approximately 2 scaled score points .... a test taker who
has a true score of 35 [on the 10 to 48 scale] would obtain an obsered
score between 30 and 40 nine times out of ten.252
The controversy surrounding the composition of questions and
scoring of the LSAT reveals that test development should be open,
subject to criticism, and reflect the broad legal community. Unfor-
tunately, this has not been the test agency tradition.2 53 The latest
change in LSAT scoring, introduced in 1990, received criticism for
being done in a rush and without proper consultation with the law
school community. As one law school dean pointed out, "[T]he
precipitous way in which the Board [of the LSAC] has sought to
make changes in the LSAT makes it appear that we are dealing with
an instrument that is so delicate and so finely tuned that any delay in
correcting it would cause havoc." 25
B. Test Secrecy Perpetuates Test Bias
Test agencies vigorously opposed Truth in Testing. They argued
that bias would be increased because reusing questions would give
students who previously saw the questions an unfair advantage over
those who had not.255 However, the real unfairness is the failure to
disclose. If all test questions were available, perhaps through local
libraries, then all test takers would, at minimum, have the opportu-
nity to read the questions.2 56
251. LAW SCHOOL ADMISSION SERVICES, INTERPRETIVE GUIDE FOR LSAT SCORE UsEas
(Feb. 1990).
252. I&- (emphasis in original).
253. Muriel Cohen, Secrecy on Questions Becomes Issue in Standardized Tests, BOSTON GLOBE,
Oct. 18, 1990, at 9 (citing EDUCATIONAL TECuNOLOrY CENTER, HARVARD UNIVERSITY, SECRET(1990) and explaining that test agencies are still not disclosing the information base from
which they develop their test questions despite Truth in Testing laws).
254. Howard A. Glickstein, Dean, Touro CollegeJacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center, Presi-
dent, Society of American Law Teachers, Address before the Board of Trustees of the Law
School Admission Council 2 (Sept. 8, 1990) (on file with the author).
255. AAMC II, supra note 14, at 887. Additionally, the AAMC flatly stated that no dis-
dosed questions or portions of disclosed questions would be reused in the MCAT. Id.
256. The test agencies publish preparation material for the tests. Unfortunately, they do
not seem to be the best judge of what constitutes helpful test preparation material. See
DONALD E. POWERS, PREPARING, FOR THE SAT: A SURVEY OF PROGRAMS AND RESOURCES, Col-
lege Board Report No. 88-7 (1988) (stating that SAT test takers surveyed rated SAT prepara-
tion programs outside of school to be the most helpful activity in raising their scores and
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Secrecy exacerbates economic discrimination between test tak-
ers.25 7 Students with money, who are connected to the right net-
works to know the best preparation courses, have access to the
secrets of the tests. The AAMC tells us that the MCAT is a secure
test because it has never been released.258 This rhetoric is used to
keep the test secure from bias scrutiny by educators and research-
ers. Meanwhile, test preparation coaching courses have used verba-
tim copies of the MCAT.259 The AAMG sued and stopped this
verbatim use of previous MCAT questions.2 60 Nevertheless, it is
clear that the test, in reality, is not "secure."
The difficulty in obtaining actual test questions does not make it
impossible.261 There is no such thing as an absolutely secure
test.262 The result is that the cost of the best test preparation
reporting that test takers judged the College Board booklet, TAKING TM SAT, to be the least
helpful).
257. For example, with the SAT, "studies done over the last 20 years prove that coaching
courses can raise a student's score by 100 points...." Anthony DePalma, SATCoadingRaises
Scores, Report Says, N.Y. TiMEs, Dec. 18, 1991, at B9. However, "FairTest argues that minori-
ties, low-income students and those students whose first language is not English often score
too low to qualify for admissions or scholarships because they cannot afford coaching classes
available to more affluent candidates." Muriel Cohen, Testing Firm Said to Hide Coaching Benejits
on SATs, BosToN GLOBE, Dec. 18, 1991, at 78.
258. AAMC III, supra note 14, at 521.
259. See AAMC III, supra note 14, at 521 (noting that a previously administered MCAT
exam, "compromised by unauthorized disclosure," is available to applicants to use as a prac-
tice exam); see also AAMC v. Mikaelian, 571 F. Supp. 144 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (detailing AAMC's
copyright infringement action where a test preparation agency's materials contained verbatim
questions from previously administered exams).
260. See Mikaelian, 571 F. Supp. 144 (granting the AAMC's request for a preliminary in-
junction to enjoin a test preparation agency from using verbatim MCAT questions in its test
preparation materials).
261. At the testimony in favor of the Truth in Testing law, Senator Halperin explained
what everyone who is part of the right network knows:
I was the beneficiary of one of these [coaching] courses .... I had seen those ques-
tions [for both the LSAT and the Multistate Bar] and the reason I had seen them is
not because anybody saw the test ahead of time, but because over the years the same
questions are used, and the people who put together these courses have a little sys-
tem worked out where they select certain people to remember certain questions and
they come back and they actually have a list of all the questions that are asked year
after year .... I already had an advantage because I was able to afford the cost [of the
course] .... [O]ne reason for disclosing the questions is to put everyone on equal
footing since really the questions are not as secret as some would be led to believe.
NYJoint Hearing, supra note 80, at 23-25 (Testimony of Senator Halperin).
262. See Hinerfeld, supra note 180, at 72 (describing a coaching service employee's test
taking on the East Coast and telephoning of test information to test takers on the West Coast
on the day of the exam). In his article, Hinerfeld states,
O]rganized academic fraud is on the rise and apparently beyond the knowledge or
control ofauthorities. Most of these students seem to know at least one person who
cheated on the SAT, and the variety of ingenuity of their methods is astounding-
from the buddy system, in which friends swap answers during breaks to the surrogate
approach to the use of wristwatch-size data banks that can store vocabulary words
and formulas. Says one college freshman: "It's easier to cheat on the SAT than to
get a six-pack of beer."
Hinerfeld, supra note 180, at 76.
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courses, the ones with close facsimile questions, will be high. Thus,
those medical school applicants with money, will have a distinct ad-
vantage over other students.2 63 Indeed, if MCAT questions are now
routinely reused, the validity of the current MCAT is questionable.
Finally, the Association of American Medical Colleges argued that
MOAT questions need to be reused because there is a limited pool
of these questions. 264 This argument places a mask of neutrality on
the test. How can there be bias subject to correction if there is an
Aristotelian definiteness to MOAT questions? The MOAT is com-
prised of approximately 300 questions on math and science.2 65 The
AAMC gives the MOAT to thousands of persons with pre-med, un-
dergraduate science backgrounds. These test takers have attended
hundreds of different undergraduate colleges and had many differ-
ent science and math professors, all of whom gave examinations
which we can assume contained many thousands of different ques-
tions. The AAMC now asks us to believe that, contrary to the obvi-
ous experience of the whole of the academic world, the universe of
possible test questions is a small, "finite pool. ' ' 266 Similar "limited
263. See Joshua Hammer, Cram Scam: Fighting Educational Injustice for Fun and Profit;
Princeton Review Course, THE NEw REPUBLIC, April 24, 1989, at 15 (interviewingJohn Katzman,
founder of the Princeton Review). Katzman says he based "more than 50 percent.. ." of his
teaching on having students "get inside the heads of the test makers and figure out how to get
the right answers, or at least improve their odds, without actually learning much of sub-
stance." Id.
In the Logical Reasoning section of the LSAT certain test "coaching" tricks became insider,
elitist knowledge well before official release of actual tests through the Truth in Testing law.
In 1984, because of Truth in Testing legislation, David White of Testing for the Public, ana-
lyzed long-used coaching tricks based on actual LSAT forms. See WHrrE, EFFECTS OF COACH-
ING, QUESTIONS, AND BIAS supra note 8, at 6-7. For example, White found that two out of
three items designated as "Major Objective" began with a gerund (a verbal noun ending in "-
ing"). He stated:
Thus, by merely remembering this rule, the candidate would be correct in the selec-
tion of 2/3 of the Major Objectives after merely reading the first word of the state-
ment to be classified. .. -The most disturbing aspect of the LSAT trick may be its
origins. The gerund rule was first discovered by this author through a third hand
report from a former administrator of the Stanley H. Kaplan LSAT Preparation
Course. Once LSAT forms were released, this author applied the rule with success.
Later, widespread knowledge of the gerund rule was confirmed in conversations with
students attending some of the most prestigious, selective law schools in the na-
tion-students who had previously taken a coaching course which taught the gerund
trick."
WHITE, EFFECTS OF COACHING, QUESTIONS, AND BIAS supra note 8, at 6; see also Stuart Katz et
al., Answering Reading Comprehension Items Without Passages on the SAT, I PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE
122, 126-27 (1992) (suggesting that SAT verbal scores are heavily influenced by factors other
than real verbal ability and that examinees in their study answered a substantial number of
reading comprehension questions correctly without reading the passage).
264. AAMC II, supra note 14, at 878.
265. See AAMC HI, supra note 14, at 521 (describing the composition of the MCAT and
stating that its purpose is to measure the test takers quantitative and reading skills and knowl-
edge of biology, physics, and chemistry).
266. See American Assoc. of Medical Colleges v. Mikaelian, 571 F. Supp. 144, 147 (E.D.
Pa. 1983) (stating AAMC's claim that there exists a finite number ofpotential questions due to
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pool" arguments are often made by agencies and institutions that
want to avoid claims that they are biased and exclusive. 267 Secret
tests are the best insulation from scrutiny. An absolute, finite pool
of questions is the best protection from responsibility for race and
sex bias.
CONCLUSION
The Educational Testing Service, constructing the LSAT for the
LSAC, understands bias and corrects for it in the same way that bias
is addressed by law schools and courts. There have been consistent
efforts in the past ten years to be inclusive, to be diverse. The test
makers acknowledge that the older tests only reflected white, male
life experience. The test now includes issues about women and
other cultures.
While I laud efforts to diversify, I am concerned that diversity too
often means, as Leslie Bender has so aptly stated, "Add women and
stir."268s Too often people with institutional power, like ETS, law
professors, and judges, are not careful of what they say or how they
say it. They are insensitive to the whole of their audience, including
the historically disempowered.
The faculty and administrators of law schools who comprise legal
academia have a responsibility to assure that the LSAT is a meaning-
ful measure of admissibility to the profession.26 9 It is not enough
that a correlation to law school performance be demonstrated. Fun-
damental fairness demands more. For example, suppose there was
compelling statistical evidence of a nearly complete correlation be-
the limitation of questions to "basic science course knowledge.... in order to avoid asking
highly sophisticated questions which would unfairly advantage students with extensive educa-
tion in a particular area tested over those students who took basic science courses in prepara-
tion for medical school). This is the most audacious use of the "pool" argument I have seen.
267. For example, law school faculties argue that there are so few minorities in teaching
because the "pool" of qualified candidates is limited. Compare Randall L. Kennedy, Racial
Critiques of Legal Academia, 102 HAtv. L. Rav. 1745, 1762 (1989) (challenging Derrick Bell's
race-based exclusion argument in The Unspohen Limit on Affirmative Action: The Chronicle of the
DeVine Gft, in AND WE ARE NoT SAvED 140-61 (1987) and suggesting that Bell does not suffi-
ciently address the fact that the paucity of minority professors on law school faculties is due to
the lack of minority applicants possessing the necessary qualifications) with Espinoza, supra
note 30, at 1882 (critizing Kennedy's assessment of Bell's argument by citing to an interpreta-
tion ofstatistics, compiled by the American Association of Law Schools, which found the "cre-
dentials of the majority of minority candidates hired to law schools' faculties to be comparable
." to other candidates).
268. Leslie Bender, Sex Discrimination or Gender Inequality, 57 FORDHAM L. REV. 941, 950
(1989).
269. See Glickstein, supra note 254, at 8 ("I believe that it is only the law schools that
should be allowed to decide whether we (through the LSATJ separate people into 39 different
groups or 61 different groups when we decide who deserves to be admitted to law school and
to the legal profession.").
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tween income of the applicant's parents and success in law school.
Would law schools be justified in using parental wealth as a basis for
admission?270
We need to force our institutions and ourselves to be careful in
the use of language. Language is powerful. The effort to choose
correct language, to try to root out bias, is not about magic formu-
lae. Discussing law school examinations, Professor Patricia Williams
writes: "This brings me back to my original issue - how to distin-
guish the appropriate introduction of race, gender, class, social pol-
icy, into law-school classrooms... I think such discussion should be
ongoing, constant, among faculties willing to hear diverse points of
view - as difficult as such conversations are, and as long-term and
noisy as they may have to be."' 271 Disclosure of admissions tests
through Truth in Testing will continue this conversation.
270. Grades and references are less subject to fraud than are SAT scores. "'It's one more
example of how one three-hour test on a Saturday morning is a lot easier to scam than a
grade-point average,' says Sarah Stockwell of the nonprofit student-advocacy group
FairTest." Hinerfeld, supra note 180, at 76.
271. Wi.tiAms, supra note 38, at 90.
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